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Jan 032015
 

The Dallas Cowboys run game has vaulted them into the playoffs, providing a strong offensive identity for a team that has struggled to break into the elite ranks of the NFL. This run game is nothing revolutionary; to the contrary, it is a simple, zone based scheme. NFL fans often view the word “simple” as an insult – with the apparent conventional thinking being that an offense must be complex and a coach must vary his schemes every week in order to confound defenses. While there is truth to the notion that game planning and varied schematics are essential in the NFL, the 2014 Cowboys achieved success by investing in their offensive line and getting great at their base schemes, and using those base schemes over and over again to open large holes for DeMarco Murray, who led the NFL in rushing by almost 500 yards.

The first thing to note is that – as mentioned above – the Cowboys have invested heavily in their offensive line with high draft picks, and it has paid off. Their line as a unit is agile, smart, and does a great job of sustaining blocks. The second thing to note, however, is that they do not – as a general rule – blow the opposition off the ball. Covering up the defense – aka getting bodies on bodies and taking defenders where the defenders want to go – is more important to their success than is drive blocking those defenders down the field. As illustrated below in their week 14 game against the Chicago Bears, in which Murray ran for his season high of 179 yards, the Cowboys’ offensive linemen took great angles, prevented penetration, were patient with their blocks, and therefore opened numerous creases for Murray and the Cowboys to exploit. It wasn’t rocket science; it was great, sustainable execution.

As Murray receives the inside zone hand off, his line covers up the Chicago defensive line

As Murray receives the inside zone handoff, his line covers up the Chicago defensive line

The Bears haven't been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens up as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders.  Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

The Bears haven’t been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders. Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

Joseph Randle takes the outside zone handoff.  The angles are flatter on the outside zone, but the result is the same: Cowboys blockers engaged with Bears defenders.

Joseph Randle takes the outside zone handoff. The angles are flatter on the outside zone, but the result is the same: Cowboys blockers engaged with Bears defenders.

Once again, a crease develops as Cowboys offensive linemen stay engaged on their blocks, and Randle exploits it for a 17 yard touchdown run.

Once again, a crease develops as Cowboys offensive linemen stay engaged on their blocks, and Randle exploits it for a 17 yard touchdown run.

One of the best plays in the Cowboys run game has been their counter, which has become an essential (and prolific) compliment to their zone game.  Their counter resembles a classic pin and pull scheme, with both guards pulling as the remaining blockers pin down the defenders shaded to the right.  Murray and Tony Romo simulate their initial footwork of the Cowboy zone package to set up the counter.

One of the best plays in the Cowboys run game has been their counter, which has become an essential (and prolific) compliment to their zone game. Their counter resembles a classic pin and pull scheme, with both guards pulling to the left as the remaining blockers pin down the defenders to the right. Murray and Tony Romo simulate their initial footwork of the Cowboy zone package to set up the counter.

Pulling guard Ronald Leary's crushing block highlights another Cowboys victory at the point of attack. Solid offensive line execution and linebacker over-pursuit opens a massive cutback lane, which Murray exploits for a 40 yard gain.

Pulling guard Ronald Leary’s crushing block highlights another Cowboys victory at the point of attack. Solid offensive line execution and linebacker over-pursuit opens a massive cutback lane, which Murray exploits for a 40 yard gain.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone.  A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception here.  Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the ball.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone. A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception on this play. Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the handoff.

Murray prods the hole with patience, and then explodes through another crease forged by his athletic offensive line for a 26 yard gain.

Murray prods the hole with patience, and then explodes through another crease forged by his athletic offensive line for a 26 yard gain.

A great, physical run game does not have to mean blowing the defense off the ball. Intelligence does not have to mean complexity. The Cowboys have based their offensive attack on a few plays that they execute well, once again proving that – even at the highest level of the sport – execution is the most important factor in achieving success. Obviously, they are not as simple as a Pop Warner team. They use a variety of formations and motions and shifts as well as their complimentary passing game to aid in running the ball. But, at their core, they share an important similarity with many lower level powerhouses: they are great at a few things, and everything else builds form there.

Nov 082014
 

Many coaches and fans believe that a man pass coverage scheme leads to better run defense. This is because – the thinking goes – primary run defenders are given more freedom to attack the run with aggressiveness, while primary pass defenders focus on covering receivers. If the defensive coordinator is willing to play with limited help over the top, it also allows the defense to load the box to stop the run. For example, in a common “man free” scheme against a traditional two wide receiver set, the two cornerbacks lock up the wide receivers and the safety plays over the top, while the remaining 8 defenders can play close to the line to stop the run.

Such thinking has extended to defend spread offenses. Against a “spread to run” opponent, one strategy is to lock in man coverage on the receivers to take away quick patterns, while giving your team a numerical advantage inside the box. Because of this numbers advantage, the defense can be aggressive with run fits, blitzes, and stunts. The numbers advantage can often be achieved even while keeping two safeties on the field, because of pattern matching principles, which allow outside linebackers to stay closer to the box and safeties to play the run more aggressively (further explained below).

Man coverage principles can, however, weaken a run defense.

The primary reason is because it is very difficult for a defender to play man coverage and maintain proper run discipline and pursuit. With responsibility focused on a receiver, a defender is much more likely to be run out of a play by a receiver simulating a pass pattern. Edge defenders will have difficulty preventing the ball from being run outside when they also have to defend routes that take them inside. The offense can also more easily manipulate defensive alignment in order to break contain. For example, a trips formation to one side with a tight end on the other side may lead to only a linebacker standing between the offense and the sideline on the tight end side of the field. If the offense can break that contain (against a linebacker instead of a defensive back), they have a big play on their hands.

Enter California and their prolific offensive coordinator, Tony Franklin, against the Oregon State Beavers. Oregon State under Mike Riley is and continues to be one of the most sound and well coached programs in the country, consistently fielding rugged, overachieving teams. They came into the game with a strong pass defense that seemed to match up well against Cal’s powerful air attack. In this game, however, their man principles hurt their ability to stop Cal’s running game.

As one can see below, Oregon State lines up in a two safety shell against Cal’s four wide receiver (2×2) offensive set. The outside linebackers split the distance between the #2 receivers (the 2nd receiver from the outside) and the offensive tackles. The safeties play inside shade of the #2 receivers, while the cornerbacks line up in press coverage on the wide receivers.

What is not clear is whether the Beavers are playing true man coverage, or pattern matching principles. Pattern matching is a method by which particular defenders lock in man coverage against certain offensive patterns, while playing zone against others. For example, a typical pattern matching scheme is for the outside linebackers to cover any short out route by a #2 receiver in man coverage, while they would re-route any vertical stem by the #2 receiver, and then look to help in the flat. The safety would cover any vertical route (more than 7-10 yards) by #2, while the CB would cover any vertical route by #1. In many ways, pattern matching combines the best of both zone and man coverage – nobody has to cover every pattern, so they can be more aggressive against the run, while maintaining the benefits of man coverage against the pass. Teams such as Michigan State (which bases out of a 2 safety, cover 4 pattern matching defense) and the Seattle Seahawks (a primary 1 high safety [Earl Thomas, perhaps the best safety in the game], cover 3 defense) have built dominating defenses on such principles (see https://www.totalamericanfootball.com/improving-cornerback-play-with-cover-3-and-cover-4-press-the-rise-of-richard-sherman-darqueze-dennard-the-seattle-seahawks-and-the-michigan-state-spartans/ for an in depth explanation of how such principles aid cornerback play). Michigan State’s defense has – in particular – taken the coaching world by storm. Simply put, the Spartans have laid out a blueprint that allows safeties and linebackers to play the run aggressively (thus effectively creating a 9 man box) while having less fear of being burned in the passing game, because they do not have to cover every pattern by a particular receiver. The Spartans defenders are terrific at reading run or pass and reacting accordingly. Unfortunately for the Beavers, even if they were using such a pattern matching scheme (it is unclear if they were), they were much too quick to jump into man principles on any particular play against Cal.  Franklin exploited this over-zealousness on many occasions, both on run/pass neutral downs and on obvious passing downs.

Whether or not the Beavers were playing man or a pattern matching zone on this play, their defenders locked in on receivers in man coverage as soon as those receivers ran their routes. When Cal ran the ball, Oregon State was left with little support.

Oregon State is lined up in a typical 2 safety shell, with safeties on the inside shade of the #2 receivers, OLBs splitting the distance between #2 and the offensive tackle, and the cornerbacks in press coverage.  With the outside linebackers so close to the box, Oregon State would appear to have a numbers advantage against the run.  Their front seven remains close to the ball (though both OLBs are slightly outside the box), while Cal only has 5 offensive linemen to block the interior, with no lead backs or tight ends to help counterbalance the Oregon State front.

Oregon State is lined up in a 2 safety shell, with safeties on the inside shade of the #2 receivers, outside linebackers splitting the distance between #2 and the offensive tackle, and the cornerbacks in press coverage. With the outside linebackers so close to the box, Oregon State would appear to have a numbers advantage against the run. Their front seven remains close to the ball (though both outside linebackers are slightly outside the box), while Cal only has 5 offensive linemen to block the interior, with no lead backs or tight ends to help counterbalance the Oregon State front.

Cal quarterback Jared Goff turns and immediately hands to running back Daniel Lasco.  There is no pass fake from the backfield action (though Goff does fake setting up for a pass after he hands the ball to Lasco).

Cal quarterback Jared Goff turns and immediately hands to running back Daniel Lasco. There is no initial pass fake from the backfield action (though Goff does fake setting up for a pass after he hands the ball to Lasco).

After the ball is handed off, we see that the Beavers have already lost both CBs.  Both have their backs turned, defending pass patterns.  Even worse, their playside outside linebacker has turned his back to the ball, and is covering a slot receiver on a quick out route.  Both safeties are eyeing the slot receivers.

After the ball is handed off, we see that the Beavers have already lost both cornerbacks. Both have their backs turned, defending pass patterns. Even worse, their playside outside linebacker has turned his back to the ball, and is covering a slot receiver on a quick out route. Both safeties are eying the slot receivers.

As Lasco reaches the line of scrimmage, the Beavers have lost their advantage.  The playside outside linebacker is almost beyond the hash marks, still chasing the quick out route.  The playside safety IS outside the hash marks, most likely looking to help with the vertical route being run by receiver #1 to his side.  Both cornerbacks are completely removed from the play, as is the weakside safety, who is also likely to be helping with the vertical route by his #1.

As Lasco reaches the line of scrimmage, the Beavers have lost their advantage. The playside outside linebacker is almost beyond the hash marks, still chasing the quick out route. The playside safety IS outside the hash marks, most likely looking to help with the vertical route being run by receiver #1 to his side. Both cornerbacks are completely removed from the play, as is the weakside safety, who is also likely to be helping with the vertical route by his #1.

Notice that the Cal offensive line hasn't manhandled anybody - they simply put bodies on bodies.  The Oregon State middle linebacker has filled his gap decently well - but there is no help from the playside linebacker or safety to squeeze the play, and Lasco easily scoots outside.  No support means that nothing is squeezed to the middle of the field, effectively rendering meaningless any pursuit from the Oregon State front.

Notice that the Cal offensive line hasn’t manhandled anybody – they simply put bodies on bodies. The Oregon State middle linebacker has filled his gap decently well – but there is no help from the playside outside linebacker or safety to squeeze the play, and Lasco easily scoots outside. No support means that nothing is squeezed to the middle of the field, effectively rendering meaningless any pursuit from the Oregon State front.

Lasco heads towards the secondary.  The playside safety has now reacted, but - as with his middle linebacker - he has no help from his opposite safety, allowing Lasco to veer easily away from his pursuit.

Lasco heads towards the secondary. The playside safety has now reacted, but – as with his middle linebacker – he has no help from his opposite safety, allowing Lasco to veer easily away from his pursuit.

As Lasco cruises into the end zone, neither the backside safety nor the backside cornerback has come into view - both have been occupied by the #1 receiver.

As Lasco cruises into the end zone, neither the backside safety nor the backside cornerback has come into view – both have been occupied by the #1 receiver.

Every defense has its weakness. This post is not meant to say that man coverage and man principles cannot produce great defensive football. The aim of the post is to point out a (perhaps) hidden weakness in man coverage that many fans and coaches do not consider.

See the video here:

http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=espn:11807066

Jul 042014
 

The counter sweep is not a common play, but for decades the Nebraska Cornhuskers used it as a primary weapon to power their prolific run game.

The counter sweep is closely related to the counter trey, which became – and remains – a staple in the run game. The blocking schemes look identical at the start of the play, but differ at one key point.

In the counter trey, the pulling guard attempts to kick out the defensive end. The tackle (or sometimes a back) cuts inside of this block to lead the play.

In the counter sweep, the pulling guard “log” blocks the defensive end. This means that – rather than kick the end out – the guard attempts to pin him to the inside. The tackle’s path is deeper in the backfield than on the counter trey, and he goes outside of the guard’s block, looking to lead the play wide and down the field.

The counter trey is a power, off tackle run. The counter action by the backfield seeks to draw the defense in the wrong direction for a split second, which is then exploited by power and numbers at the point of attack.

The counter sweep also attempts to influence the defense to the wrong side of the field, but the play seeks to get the ball carrier as far as possible from the interior of the line.

This resulted in consistent big plays for Nebraska. Of course, Nebraska was also one of the most physical teams in the country, often employing the best offensive lines and the most talented backs. The defense needed to react hard to the play side, and Nebraska exploited that fact by caving in the other side of the line with power, and leading the play with swift, disciplined pulling linemen who were followed by backs who could outrun everyone to the sideline.

While most teams won’t enjoy such advantages, it is surprising that the counter sweep is not employed more often, if nothing more than as a compliment to the counter trey. The two plays go hand in hand. Not surprisingly, Nebraska used a play they called “counter trap” to compliment the counter sweep. Their counter trap featured the guard kicking out the end, and the guard cutting inside of his block – just like the counter trey.

The counter sweep adjustment – at the least – should be installed, to account for a block down step down defensive end. Such an end can be almost impossible to uproot with a kick out block, but is very easy to log block. The tackle and ball carrier should be able to read this block and run to the outside, thus – in effect – executing the famous Nebraska counter sweep.

For video of the Nebraska counter sweep:

For more analysis and video (including the Nebraska counter trap), visit trojanfootballanalysis.com:

http://trojanfootballanalysis.com/?p=55

Jun 192014
 

The trend towards pass first offensive football has generally led to a decrease in run game intricacy. Spread and pass first teams have found that they can put up high point totals with only a few simple run blocking schemes. This approach is sound – with focus on the passing game, the simplified run game means that high levels of execution can be attained on the few blocking schemes that are in the playbook.

This does mean that some concepts of the past have been largely lost. The following play exemplifies the lost art of the complex run game, a tackle trap on a top nose guard (Tony Casillas), intended to make that nose guard’s life difficult while opening a sizeable hole and utilizing angles across the line of scrimmage.

The blocking scheme: Right tackle blocks down on star MLB Brian Bosworth.  Right guard pulls and looks for work. Center posts on star nose guard Tony Casillas, then walls off the defensive tackle.  Left guard goes for the other MLB.  The left tackle pulls and traps Casillas, while the fullback walls the other defensive tackle to the outside.

The blocking scheme: TE walls off the outside.  Right tackle blocks down on star MLB Brian Bosworth. Right guard pulls and looks for work downfield. Center posts on star nose guard Tony Casillas, then walls off the defensive tackle. Left guard goes for the other MLB. The left tackle pulls and traps Casillas, while the fullback walls the other defensive tackle to the outside.

The blocks take advantage of angles, including the smashing trap on Casillas.

The blocks take advantage of angles, including the smashing trap on Casillas.

Casillas is sent to the turf as running back Jacque Robinson (father of NBA star Nate) exploits a wide running lane.

Casillas is sent to the turf as running back Jacque Robinson (father of NBA star Nate) exploits a wide running lane.

Robinson is untouched into the defensive backfield.

Robinson is untouched into the defensive backfield.

Robinson finally faces impact at the goalline.

Robinson finally faces impact at the goalline.

Often, the best offensive system is the one that goes against contemporary trends. Increasingly, teams are finding that the spread offense is not a magic bullet. While the many variations of the spread ARE sound football, defenses are now built to stop them, and those offenses lack the novelty that once made them so difficult to defend.

Perhaps those defenses – built to stop the spread passing game and various zone running schemes – are now susceptible to a return to power running. The Stanford Cardinal under Jim Harbaugh and David Shaw, as well as the San Francisco 49ers under Harbaugh, have capitalized by building swift, powerful lines and incorporating complex run schemes and jumbo personnel packages. Once a staple, those schemes are now the novelty while the spread offense thrives. While mastering the execution of a run game complete with powers and counters and traps and whams and isolations can be difficult, it is more than possible with proper commitment.

The play:

May 172014
 

“Read option” is one of the most overused terms in football. From commentators to sideline reporters to sportswriters, a myriad of plays are lumped together and mislabeled “read option.”

In reality, every option is a “read” option. The quarterback always reads an unblocked defender or defenders to determine whether to give the ball, keep it, or pitch it.

Still, the “read option” has become synonymous with shotgun, spread option football. The play that epitomized the spread option running game is what most coaches call the “zone read.” The key feature of this play is that the offensive line zone blocks for a run to the right or left, while the quarterback reads a defender to the backside. If that defender over pursues the zone handoff to the running back, the quarterback keeps the ball to the space that he vacated.

5 Eagles offensive linemen for 5 Giants defenders; the 6th defender (in the yellow box) becomes the option key.

5 Eagles offensive linemen for 5 Giants defenders; the 6th defender (in the yellow box) becomes the option key.

In short, in the zone read, the quarterback and running back are going in opposite directions from one another.

The quarterback and running back aim in opposite directions

The quarterback and running back aim in opposite directions

The zone read – for whatever reason – became known as the “read option.” This was a fine development, until it began to be applied to every option play from the shotgun or pistol formation.

The option key tackles the running back, so the quarterback keeps to the vacated space

The option key tackles the running back, so the quarterback keeps to the vacated space

The option key tackles the running back; the quarterback has correctly kept the ball.

The option key tackles the running back; the quarterback has correctly kept the ball.

Easy yards for the quarterback

Easy yards for the quarterback on the zone read (“read option”)

The most glaring example of this phenomenon was during the “read option” explosion in the NFL in 2012, when both the 49ers and Redskins had great success with the “read option” from the Pistol formation. The only problem is that the vast majority of their success was not from the “read option,” but from the veer scheme.

In the veer scheme, the option/dive key is the first man on or outside the offensive tackle

In the veer scheme, the option/dive key is the first man on or outside the offensive tackle

The key difference between the veer and the zone read is that in the veer scheme, the dive back and the quarterback are both attacking the same side of the field. In the traditional veer scheme, the offensive line does not block the first man on or outside the play side tackle. This becomes the option key. The dive back aims – at full speed – between the guard and the tackle. If the option key can’t make the tackle, the quarterback hands off, and the running back runs underneath the option key, following extra blocks on the second level and third level (because the tackle and tight end – if there is one – do not block anyone on the line of scrimmage, which frees them to block downfield). If the option key can tackle the dive back, he can’t tackle the quarterback. The quarterback keeps the ball, and follows the same extra downfield blocking (note that in a true veer triple option – which the 49ers and Redskins rarely ran – the quarterback would have a second option key and the option to pitch to a pitch back depending on that option key’s movements).

 

The quarterback and running back attack the same side of the field in the veer scheme.  Here, the option key is too far up the field, so the ball is given to the dive back

The quarterback and running back attack the same side of the field in the veer scheme. Here, the option key is too far up the field, so the ball is given to the dive back

Thus, in the “read option” the quarterback and the running back go in opposite directions, while in the veer scheme they attack the same side of the field and follow the same blocking.

 

The offensive line walls off the middle of the field, and the dive back follows behind, while the option key cannot recover

The offensive line walls off the middle of the field, and the dive back follows behind, while the option key cannot recover

The dive back glides along the veer wall to the end zone

The dive back glides along the veer wall to the end zone

Less common in the NFL, but still mislabeled, is the midline option. The play is similar to the veer scheme, except that the option key is the first man on or outside the play side guard, and the dive back’s path is over center or just to the play side (depending on the coach). Again, this varies from the “read option” in that the dive back and the quarterback both run to the same side of the field.

Apr 132014
 

Prior to 2013, critics doubted whether Chip Kelly could succeed in the NFL.  Many tagged him with the dreaded “college coach” label.  Kelly – along with Jim Harbaugh and Pete Carroll – are quickly turning that label into a positive.  Harbaugh has done so with his power schemes and manic enthusiasm, Carroll with his passion and smothering defense.  Chip Kelly has done so with an emphasis on simplicity and execution, two qualities that are often overlooked in what has largely become a complex, matchup based league.

Kelly’s devotion to the hurry up no huddle is well known, with the extra repetitions gained in practice and games combining with a comparably simple playbook to improve execution.  His offense is no gimmick – it is based on sound football principles.  At his core, Kelly wants to run the ball.  The basis of this running game are his zone concepts.

Kelly teaches a counting system to his offensive line on zone running plays.  This simplifies their reads, as the line merely needs to count the defense in the box and block it accordingly.  The center identifies 0, the first in-box defender to the playside.  The playside guard blocks number 1 (the next defender to the playside), and the tackle blocks number 2.  The backside guard blocks number 1 backside, and the backside tackle blocks number 2 backside.  A tight end or extra blocker would block number 3.  Kelly’s famous “read option” (as it has become known) assigns the quarterback to “block” any extra backside defender with his eyes, if there is one.  If that player is aggressive on the handoff, the quarterback keeps the ball to the space he vacated.  If that player is not aggressive on the handoff, the quarterback has successfully “blocked” him from tackling the ball carrier.  If no such “extra” defender is in the box, the quarterback hands the ball off every time.  Thus, what has become known as a “read option” is nothing more than a zone run that gives the quarterback the ability to keep the ball if the defense brings more defenders than the offensive line can block.

The simplicity and execution of this counting system can be seen in LeSean McCoy’s 2013 week 1 touchdown against the Washington Redskins.

Before the snap, we see the Eagles in an unbalanced formation, with three offensive linemen to their left.  The play will be run to their right.  As one can see below, their counting system allows them to adjust to the defensive front with ease  – a necessity in the NFL, where defenses are ever changing and complex.  Note that the stacked defensive lineman and linebacker to the playside are both considered player 1 and player 2, necessitating a combo block from the right guard and right tackle (who in this case is a tight end).  This complex blocking takes time and communication to master, another reason why the simplicity of Kelly’s offense is a benefit to their team.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 1

As the play unfolds, we can see the linemen taking great angles to “cover up” their men.  This is a hallmark of zone blocking – it is more important to get a body on a defensive player and wash him towards the direction he wants to go than it is to attempt to blow them up off the ball.  We can also see Michael Vick “blocking” the extra defender in the box (#4). Additionally, McCoy’s momentum begins parallel to the line of scrimmage, towards the sideline, influencing Redskins defenders to fight towards the outside.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 2

McCoy has the ball now, and has made his hard cut down the field.  We can see that some of the Redskins are still moving towards the sideline, as their momentum – and the Eagles blockers – are taking them there.  The hole is large for McCoy, and not because any of his linemen have made a devastating knockout block.  None of the linemen have driven a Redskins player off the ball.  But they have put bodies on bodies, allowing a back with great vision and talent such as McCoy to find and exploit the opening seam of the defense.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 3

This allows McCoy to get into the open field with a head of steam.  He is among the hardest runners in the NFL to tackle when given such space.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 4

Kelly’s offense has always thrived on letting his athletes perform in space.  Here we get an example: McCoy hurdling a defender as he winds back towards the opposite sideline.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 5

And we see the final element of what makes Kelly’s offense tick: downfield blocking by receivers.  As in all “big play” running offenses, Kelly depends on his receivers to help turn long runs into touchdown runs.  Here we get a great example of McCoy reading Riley Cooper’s butt to cut inside, aided by the terrific cut block by Jason Avant to form a clear running lane.

Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 6

McCoy gives Eagles fans an example of what Oregon fans grew to know well – a runner in the clear with enough space to celebrate before reaching the end zone.

Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 7

Chip Kelly has done a tremendous job of creating a system that can take advantage of the talent he has on his teams.  The beauty of the system is that it is based on sound football principles.  Though it has been labeled a “space age” offense, perhaps the biggest innovation of the system is the return of simplicity to the NFL.   This simplicity also means that his system is duplicable at all levels of play.  Even if one doesn’t want to run the hurry up or the spread, teaching such a counting system to the offensive line is an easy way to improve their communication.  No matter how complex the defensive front is, it can always be boiled down to a simple count.  Much like Kelly’s offense, the beauty lies in the simplicity.

Mar 292014
 

The wham block is an underutilized weapon that will turn the aggressiveness of a dominant defensive lineman against him.

Related to the trap, the wham block sends a skill player to block a defensive lineman from an angle with an element of surprise.  Often utilizing motion, the wham discourages penetration by sending the message that the defensive lineman can never know when he will be blindsided along the line of scrimmage.

Wham 1

Diagram 1 (above) shows the blocking scheme for the play.  Delanie Walker is sent in short motion, giving him increased momentum to blast Ndamukong Suh.  Notice how the scheme, combined with trap and fold blocks across the line, allows 49ers offensive linemen to block down the field.  This downfield blocking is a hallmark of big plays in the run game.  The scheme turns the Lions aggressiveness against itself, wasting the defensive linemen who were quick to penetrate up the field.

Wham 2

Diagram 2 (above): The moment of impact.

Wham 3

Diagram 3 (above): The meeting of scheme and execution.  The 49ers scheme has worked to perfection – two defensive linemen (including Suh, the disruptive force who necessitates the scheme) are already behind the play, wasted to the defensive.  Four 49er offensive linemen are down the field to make blocks.

Also note Vernon Davis.  As the play unfolds, he blocks his man across the field.  In diagram 1, we see the defensive end lined up on Davis’s inside shade.  In diagram 2, Davis has locked him to the inside.  In diagram 3, Davis has begun to drive him across the formation.  In diagram 4, Davis has driven him off the screen.

Davis’s block as well as the 49ers offensive line’s ability to block downfield reminds us that no matter what the scheme, the most important predictor of success is the execution of fundamentals. 

Wham 4

Discouraging aggressiveness encourages passivity, which helps to control a dominant defensive line or a particular defensive lineman.  The wham – despite having faded in popularity – is a valuable tool in achieving that end.  It is one of the power elements that Jim Harbaugh has brought to the table in turning also-rans at the University of San Diego, Stanford, and the 49ers into contenders.