Continuing my “series” about quarterback evaluations in the NFL (see here, here, here, and here), I will choose the quarterback who may not possess every attribute to be considered a top prospect, but who possesses the essential qualities of a professional pocket quarterback.
To summarize some of what I have written in previous posts: the ideal quarterback prospect in terms of draft evaluation is big (both tall and well built), athletic, has great accuracy and arm strength, has experience and production in a pro style offense, is a leader, and presents no off the field concerns. In other words, he is Andrew Luck. Andrew Luck is a once every 10 or 15 (if not more) years prospect. Neither Jameis Winston nor Marcus Mariota fulfills every one of those categories, but their combination of assets makes them likely top five draft picks (though some of this is due to a combination of the scarcity of quarterback prospects and the importance of the position; in a perfect world, in my opinion, neither would be selected until later in the round, because each comes with some concerns – system and arm strength for Mariota, off the field problems and interceptions for Winston. This does not mean that both can’t become solid NFL quarterbacks).
Not all of those attributes are required, however, to become a serviceable or even great NFL quarterback. Tom Brady fell in the draft because he was not well built, was slow, and was not considered to possess an elite arm. Drew Brees was too short. Aaron Rodgers was slight of build, a Jeff Tedford “system” quarterback, and not athletic. Joe Montana was slight of build and weak armed. The list could go on.
Who, then, fits the bill of a quarterback prospect who does not possess all of the “top prospect” traits, but who may possess enough of the important ones?
Oregon State’s Sean Mannion.
Sean Mannion is not an electric athlete. He is a pure pocket passer. His 5.14 40 yard dash is not terrible, but he will not make his living with his legs. His statistics were not good last year – his touchdown to interception ratio was only 15-8. He is not considered a top prospect.
But what are his strengths?
Mannion started for four years in an offense that ran many pro concepts. Unlike many college quarterbacks, he took many snaps from under center. He made NFL reads and audibles at the line of scrimmage, and is accustomed to three and five and seven step drops. He has a strong arm. He is forced to be a pocket quarterback, because he has no other option (much like Tom Brady or Peyton Manning, he has never and will never have the ability to win at a high level with his legs). When he had NFL talent to throw to – such as Brandin Cooks in 2013 – he thrived (throwing for 37 touchdowns and 15 interceptions in 2013).
Of course, the fail rate at quarterback is too high to say that Mannion will succeed as an NFL quarterback. The odds are against him. However, when you strip away traits that have been shown to be unnecessary to becoming a great quarterback (top athleticism, for one), Mannion stacks up favorably with every quarterback in the draft. The chances are never good for a quarterback to succeed in the NFL, but Mannion’s possession of essential quarterback traits puts him on even ground for success (given the opportunity) with any quarterback in the draft.
One of Mannion’s most productive games from 2013, against an always tough Utah defense:
By now, it is clear to those who follow the draft that the (on the field) evaluation between Marcus Mariota and Jameis Winston hinges in large part on whether one believes that Mariota can be accurately evaluated as a professional quarterback, due to his operating Oregon’s “college” offense. Winston, on the other hand, is considered more of a known entity, due to his operating a “professional” offense that allows evaluators to see him make “professional” reads and throws.
I use quotation marks for “college” and “professional” because the line between college and professional offensive systems is increasingly blurry. I find the use of such terms to lack nuance, and believe that “college” is used in an incorrectly negative way. I do not agree with the notion that quarterbacks running “college” offenses will necessarily struggle in the NFL, and I disagree that “college” offenses are lesser than “professional” offenses. I believe that “college” offenses are often smarter and more efficient than “professional” offenses, and that creating a system that is simple to learn and that can defeat any defense takes at least as much intelligence and creativity as does building a complex, gameplan-oriented “professional” offense.
Having said that, evaluating a quarterback who has only operated out of one style of offense is inherently difficult when projecting him to play in another style of offense – and this is the difficulty in evaluating Mariota for teams who do not wish to adopt an offense similar to what Mariota ran at Oregon and what his former coach – Chip Kelly – runs with the Eagles.
Put aside, as well, the debate as to whether professional teams should adopt quarterback friendly offensive schemes to fit the skills of their quarterbacks (see here, here, and here for speculation on the future of quarterback play in the NFL). This post only seeks to clarify why the evaluation is difficult for one who seeks to draft Mariota and use him in a traditional, “professional” offense.
The following videos (produced by draftbreakdown.com, a great resource for studying more than the highlights of college prospects) of Marcus Mariota and Jameis Winston in the Rose Bowl playing against each other display these differences.
Mariota against Florida State:
Note, from the outset, Oregon’s reliance on quick screens. These passes are not a staple of professional offenses, but make up a significant portion of Oregon’s attack. As you continue to watch, note how many times Mariota takes quick drops from play action fakes. 0:23 is a great example. Mariota executes a play action fake, then snaps his feet and bounces in the pocket. There is no drop, and his pocket is clean. None of these elements are helpful to NFL evaluators. Evaluators want to see a quarterback take a drop from under center (Mariota almost never did so) or – at the least – to make a full read progression, and they want to evaluate him from a collapsing pocket. Oregon’s offensive style and prodigiousness makes finding such plays difficult. Mariota throws on the play to a receiver crossing with room behind the linebacker level. Again, while such a throw does happen in the NFL, it is not considered a timing pass that can accurately display Mariota’s ability to make NFL throws into tighter windows that close faster than in college. Though he misses the throw here, this is the type of concept (crossing routes behind linebackers who are held by run fakes) that Mariota and Oregon thrive on. As you watch the film, keep track of how many times Mariota starts in a similar fashion – play fake, set feet, quick throw (screen or otherwise). Or – three step drop, quick throw. NFL evaluators have fewer plays on which to evaluate Mariota making “professional” throws and reads, and fewer plays equals more uncertainty. Uncertainty is not what many scouts want when drafting a quarterback high in the first round.
Winston against Oregon:
Winston, on the other hand, crosses off many of the boxes (on the field, that is) for a top quarterback prospect. Big, well built, strong arm, good enough athlete, high scholastic intelligence (again, ignoring off the field and maturity issues), and – related to this conversation – makes “professional” throws from a “professional” offense. Though he also operates from the shotgun in spread formations for a high percentage of his plays (much more than the public perception seems to recognize), the evaluator can see him taking drops, setting in the pocket, and reading a full field. A much lower percentage of Winston’s throws are quick, “automatic” reads. A high percentage of Florida State’s passing plays require taking a drop, reading a progression, and delivering with timing. Anyone who watched Tom Brady in the Super Bowl knows that running a large portion of one’s offense from shotgun, spread formations is no longer just a college phenomenon. Starting at 6:51, we see two successive plays that illustrate why evaluators see Winston’s game translating to the NFL. On both throws, Winston takes a drop (albeit from the shotgun), is patient, and completes an anticipation throw to a receiver in a deep middle zone. On both throws, Winston began his throw before the receiver had broken to the inside. These plays illustrate anticipation throws that are so common in the NFL – Winston knows the route, knows where the receiver will be breaking, and knows that the defense will not be in that spot because of their zone drop concepts and their lack of momentum towards that location. Both throws show arm strength, accuracy, coverage recognition, and anticipation, all of which are considered vital to success in a “professional” offense. Evaluators will have more difficulty finding and judging these types of throws in Mariota’s game.
One key point, however, is that even though Winston operates an offense that has him making complex, “professional” reads, the offense is not a “traditional” professional offense, as much of the popular dialogue in the media would lead one to believe. In fact, a high percentage of Winston’s throws come from the shotgun. He does not consistently make 5 and 7 step drops from under center. While Mariota’s Oregon offense was certainly further removed from a “professional” offense, Winston’s Florida State offense still requires projection to a traditional “professional” offense.
Either way, the two videos illustrate the challenges for evaluators in comparing Mariota to Winston. Mariota is asked to execute an offense that requires many predetermined throws and creates a multitude of open targets that often do not require a great deal of anticipation to hit. Mariota executes the offense to near perfection, but it requires an evaluator to project his growth in a “professional” offense. Winston is asked to execute an offense that – while often from formations similar to that of Oregon – requires him to make full field reads and anticipation throws that more closely mirror “professional” concepts. Winston’s touchdown to interception ratio is far worse than Mariota’s, but an evaluator has less to project – for better or worse – when analyzing his game.
Like last year, I’ve been asked to give an hour long presentation at the Brøndby IF Super Bowl party. Rather than attempt to adapt those notes into traditional post, I’ve decided to post them in their original bullet point form, which is probably the quickest way to convey the information. I was asked to start with a discussion of the evaluation process for quarterbacks and the developments of that position. Afterwards, I discuss the matchups between the offensive and defensive units of the Seahawks and Patriots (less lengthy notes, as I will use film for much of that portion of the presentation). As I state in the presentation, I hope that these notes will make the game more interesting by illuminating sometimes hidden aspects of the game:
I’ve been asked to talk about the quarterback position – how do you evaluate it and what do you look for in a quarterback, why are the players drafted where they are drafted, and how has the position developed – through the lens of Tom Brady, Russell Wilson, and Johnny Manziel
Probably the hardest position to evaluate in all of sports – why?
My theory is that growth and development are never a sure thing in the NFL.
The NFL is so fast and complex that you can almost never know how a player will adjust – it isn’t book smarts/pure intelligence, it is the ability to scan the entire field and anticipate with the correct timing and take in large amounts of information on the fly – you won’t know if they will develop until they do – there are some predictors, like success at the college level, intelligence, accuracy, etc – but a quarterback is never sure to develop beyond where they currently are, and it is hard to now where they are when they are playing in college (so many factors, like the offense they played in, the talent around them, the level of competition, etc).
If a QB is 75% of the way there during their rookie season, there is no guarantee that they will even get to 80% – Andy Dalton might be an example
Other times, a QB goes from 75% to 85% to 100% – Peyton Manning had a rough rookie season, but kept improving and improving.
Colin Kaepernick probably started at 50% pro style offense refinement as far as what he was asked to do in college in a run/option heavy offense, 100/100 potential when he came into the league. Sat for a year, worked hard, jumped to maybe 80/100 refinement, plus all of that great athleticism, presence, competitiveness, intelligence, etc. But most will say that he stalled in 2014 at 80/100 on the refinement scale. Can he make the leap and bust that plateau? Hard to predict.
Tom Brady is a great example of difficulty in evaluation. When he was at Michigan, there was a more physically talented quarterback there – Drew Henson. He threw harder, ran faster, was a better athlete – basketball star and drafted high in baseball. In college, if they were throwing a curl route, the ball might have gotten there at the same time. BUT Brady may have been more aware of other routes and anticipated that throw, and released the ball a split second before Henson would have. Henson may have been more locked in on that one route, and thrown the ball a split second later – but it got there at the same time because his arm was stronger, and it probably looked more impressive.
As a talent evaluator, that makes it tough. As an NFL coach you look at Brady coming out of Michigan and think – he isn’t a great athlete, he isn’t going to be able to scramble, his arm isn’t amazing, he isn’t very well built…many evaluators thought he fit the mold as a backup at best.
But sometimes (and this is what evaluators seem to be shifting their opinion on), being able to do less makes you better. Brady couldn’t run, he didn’t have the Jay Cutler rocket arm, he couldn’t out muscle guys like Cam Newton can – his only chance was to develop as a true pocket quarterback – so he was forced to, his back was against the wall – either he developed as a pro style QB, or he failed. He had no chance to find success in the NFL because of other physical traits.
Henson was kind of the opposite. He could do everything. He got a $17 million baseball contract. His back wasn’t against the wall – he didn’t just have to be a pocket quarterback. He made it to the big leagues in baseball briefly, played a few years in the NFL, but his career never took off. Maybe if he couldn’t play baseball, and if he wasn’t such a good athlete, and if he couldn’t have thrown as hard, he would have been forced to develop like Tom Brady. Or…maybe he wouldn’t have developed in that way, anyways (almost no one develops into a Tom Brady level quarterback). This is why predicting success is so difficult.
Back to that curl route example – The way Brady does it computes better for the NFL, obviously. Arm strength IS very important, but Brady has enough. In the NFL, all of those other factors play more of a role. In that example, over the course of time, Brady has made the NFL throw – the quarterback who didn’t see the whole field may have missed something else open, or his lack of anticipation may have allowed a faster defender to get in the throwing lane. Over time, the quarterback who can see the field and process the information and throw with the correct anticipation, touch, and accuracy, will far outperform the rocket armed quarterback.
Similar evaluation with Aaron Rodgers v Alex Smith
Rodgers was kind of skinny, not imposing, not an amazing athlete, arm wasn’t thought to be sensational.
Smith was thought to be the entire package by many scouts – bigger, stronger, faster, smarter, easier to coach than Rodgers.
I thought it was an obvious choice for Rodgers – quick release, great feel for the game and pocket presence – but the NFL is tempted by the “prototypical quarterback” – which is big, strong, fast, throw hard, etc. Especially with the #1 overall pick.
Smith was not a finished/refined product – came from a spread system – took him time to become a solid NFL QB.
Rodgers was a finished product in a pro system and had time to sit behind Favre – not many QBs get this anymore
But many evaluators thought he would fail because other Tedford quarterbacks failed
Similar draft profile in recent years was Teddy Bridgewater – slipped in the draft because of his slight build and lack of great athleticism or arm strength, but showed an accurate arm and the ability to process information in a pro style offense in college, and a good enough athlete to evade pressure.
His rookie season was good…but, as stated above, my opinion is that it is almost impossible to predict improvement in a QB.
First round talent, had everything except for height. It is that simple – if he were a few inches taller, he would have been a top pick.
But it is important to note that I am not saying that there is a way to accurately find a great NFL quarterback – my point is that it is nearly impossible to predict and therefore has an enormous failure rate. This is not to downplay the importance of scouts and that some scouts are not great quarterback evaluators – but history has shown that the failure rate is extremely high.
If you look at what I said above, you’d be looking for a pocket quarterback with success and refinement in a pro style offense in college – guys who fit that bill include Joey Harrington and Matt Leinart – they just couldn’t do it in the NFL.
Best bet to find a QB who is successful: build the team around him, which will give whoever you choose the best chance to succeed.
Developments in the position
An argument that seems to be gaining steam among NFL evaluators is that an extremely mobile quarterback cannot also be a great pocket passer. The argument is that a pocket passer must have been a pocket passer for all his life, with his back against the wall like Tom Brady, in order to be great. Arguably, there is only one great QB who went from a running quarterback to a GREAT pocket quarterback – Steve Young. Russell Wilson is looking to change that perception – even though he was never exactly a “running” quarterback – he played in pro style offenses prior to the NFL – but the Seahawks currently ask him to run plenty of zone read plays and play action passing – he isn’t yet a great pocket quarterback (even though he executes exactly what Seattle asks of him – the offense just isn’t based on pocket passing to the extent of most NFL offenses).
Trend of previous 15 or 16 years: look for the QB who has it all. The player who was thought to revolutionize the position was Michael Vick. Strong arm, as electric as a ball carrier as anyone in the league – the idea was that he could kill you with his legs or from the pocket. This is what the quarterback of the 21st century was going to play like.
In most cases, it hasn’t quite worked out. Also important to note that the fail rate for first round quarterbacks was very high overall – so it is not as if drafting a pure pocket quarterback is close to a sure thing (as is probably obvious by this point in the presentation).
Here is a list of first round quarterbacks since Michael Vick who were thought to come from that mold – great athlete, great arm, came from a non-pro style offense
Michael Vick – “the future” – solid/electric NFL career, but never developed into a consistent/dependable pocket quarterback.
Ben Roethlisberger – played wide receiver until his senior season of high school, was mostly recruited as a tight end, but has developed until a multiple Pro Bowl, Super Bowl winning QB. Not entirely applicable to this list as he was never known as a running quarterback, and also important to note that he – like Russell Wilson – led his team to a Super Bowl championship early in his career on a run heavy team. Roethlisberger eventually developed into a pocket passer with great pocket awareness and similar evasion/improvisation skills to Wilson.
Alex Smith (arguably) – not a freak athlete like Vick, but a terrific one who came from Urban Meyer’s spread and had to be molded into a pocket QB – he did develop into a solid quarterback, but it took time.
Vince Young – some would argue that he was the most physically dominant quarterback in college football history his senior season and took over a Rose Bowl national championship against a USC team filled with NFL talent – looked promising early in his career, but failed to develop into an NFL caliber quarterback.
Tim Tebow – amazing athlete, failed to develop into an NFL caliber quarterback (a complicated issue – there are still people who make the argument that he could have succeeded if the offense had been built around his talents).
Andrew Luck – exceptional athlete and star NFL QB was always a pass first pocket QB despite his running ability – not entirely applicable to this group, but is a great athlete who was able to focus on becoming a great pocket QB.
Cam Newton – jury is still out on whether he will develop into a true pocket QB (or whether it is necessary). Has been successful and has won while developing into a pocket quarterback in an offense that takes advantage of his athleticism.
Jake Locker – great athlete so far has disappointed as a pocket quarterback – injuries have played a role.
Robert Griffin III – great rookie season, but fundamentals regressed since then – dropped very low in 2014, but still has a chance to regain form. Needs to rebuild fundamentals to have a chance – intelligence and great accuracy (when fundamentals are there) give him a chance. Injuries may force him to do so (and thus could be beneficial to his development as a pocket QB – if he makes it).
Ryan Tannehill – jury is still out on the former WR, though looks to be a starting caliber QB in offense that takes advantage of his legs (uses the zone read in a similar fashion to Seattle).
Johnny Manziel – Incomplete, but did not look good his rookie season. Failed to win starting job and looked overwhelmed in few appearances. Manic, amazing improvisational quarterback in college, strong arm – but can he fit into an NFL offense? His best chance seems to be to develop the maturity and game of Russell Wilson (their skill set in terms of size, athleticism, and arm strength is similar), or be used in an offense similar to what he ran in college. Manziel’s ratings would probably be: refinement 50/100, “magic/improvisational” potential (this is the argument that most people had for drafting him) 100/100 – unclear if that refinement will increase.
Notable non-first round quarterbacks:
Colin Kaepernick – similar to Newton, shows star potential and big game winning ability, but the jury is still out on whether he can develop into a traditional pocket QB. Amazing athletic specimen (speed/arm strength combo among the best ever). Great work ethic, intelligence – but even work ethic and intelligence and talent do not guarantee ability to develop as a pocket passer.
Russell Wilson – has thrived and won a Super Bowl while in a run first offense with a dominant defense. Intelligent, smart with the ball, great arm and improvisational qualities – great pocket presence and footwork. Refined pocket quarterback skills (also, like Luck, developed as a pocket QB) but has not yet been asked to be a high volume NFL pocket passer.
Trend that I believe is starting in the NFL: back to traditional pocket QBs. Speed may be seen as a detriment – the thought being that if the QB could run in college and high school, they did not have to develop the same kind of pocket passing/footwork/read the field skills as other QBs.
The interesting thing: more and more colleges are using spread systems with dual threat quarterbacks, and thus, while demand for pocket quarterbacks may be increasing, the supply has been decreasing for years.
From a college coach’s perspective, it is much easier to find an athlete with a good arm at QB (who may lack traditional pocket skills) than a traditional pocket QB (high schools are also moving away from pocket QBs)
THE BIG QUESTION: will NFL teams continue to try to find pocket quarterbacks, or will they adapt their systems to the “high supplied” QBs
So far, they are trying to find and mold pocket QBs, but Chip Kelly has had success with a mobile QB/non traditional offense. The Seahawks and 49ers have also relied heavily on zone read option (and veer scheme, in the 49ers case), to great success.
Take everything I just said into account – the trends in what coaches want to see out of a quarterback, the quarterbacks who are successful in the NFL, etc.
NFL teams are looking for a prototype at the top of the draft:
Tall, well built, strong arm, accurate arm, smart, competitive, great footwork, evidence of ability to scan entire field, success in an NFL style offense, mobility, maturity
This prototype rarely exists. The most prototypical prospect in recent memory was Andrew Luck: he was at least above average in all of those categories.
As noted, the trend may shift to placing less value on mobility.
Many great quarterbacks do not fit the prototype. Tom Brady slipped because he was not well built, was not a mobile quarterback, was not considered to have above average arm strength, and to some extent because Drew Henson cut into his playing time.
Russell Wilson slipped because he is short. A short QB is not a prototypical QB – if he were 6’3”, he’d have been a high first round pick – he has everything else.
Aaron Rodgers slipped because the 49ers thought he was arrogant, and perhaps because he has a slight build. He played for a coach (Jeff Tedford) who had produced several first round QBs who failed in the NFL – Rodgers was penalized for this. Some scouts felt that he was a “system” QB who got flustered under pressure and wasn’t enough of an athlete to evade it.
It is an inexact science with a high fail rate. The Patriots look like geniuses because they drafted Tom Brady, but in reality, they passed on him 6 times in the draft.
Which brings us to another issue that we do not have time to fully explore: even in the NFL, is it the system (Wilson in an offense that plays to his strengths and is supported by an all time great defense, Brady in a creative, talented franchise, had time to sit behind a good NFL QB). In other words, the eternal question is: would we be talking about these two players if they had been drafted by the Bills, or Raiders, or Jaguars, Browns, or any of the other number of teams who have struggled to find a quarterback for years – or is the reason why those teams are not relevant because they could not draft a Russell Wilson or Tom Brady caliber QB? It is a long debate, but something to think about.
This upcoming draft, another tough decision.
Jameis Winston is very close to the prototype for an NFL quarterback prospect, but he has shown major red flags in immaturity and off field decision making.
Mariota has zero off field issues/question marks and has many prototypical features, but did not play in an NFL style offense and thus his ability as an NFL pocket QB is a bigger projection – unless the Eagles trade to get him, where his former college coach (Chip Kelly) will know how to take advantage of what he brings to the table.
Built on the run game, zone read has been a potent weapon
Went to it over and over against the Packers at the end of the game when they had their offensive success
Start with Marshawn Lynch 14 yard run on first TD drive of the quarter
Ball control – they’ve made their money by relying on their defense, running the ball, and making a few big plays each game, often at key times.
Very good defense. Talent across the board, Revis is probably the best cover cornerback of the past 10 years.
Belichick is a versatile coach and therefore difficult to predict, but is consistent in molding his strategy to take away the strength of the opposing offense.
For that reason, I suspect that he will seek first to stop the Seahawks zone read, their most potent weapon
He has cornerbacks that match up well with Seattle wide receivers, thus freeing more defenders to focus on run defense.
Many coaches like a 1 high safety look in this situation, because it frees 8 men in the box to play the run.
I like 2 high safeties with press corners – we Monarchs have run the option for a few years with success, and the 2 safety teams give us more schematic problems – it is hard to block the safeties, and the cornerbacks can help build a wall across the front. We look forward to teams who want to load 8 or 9 players into the box and play man coverage, because (as long as the personnel is relatively equal) we feel that we will create big plays as there is no real 3rd level of defense. That style of defense is more boom or bust – we’ve had times where we exploited it, and other times when it gave us trouble…but when it was the latter, usually because we had injuries or were otherwise outmanned, anyways.
Downside of 2 high safeties is fewer players devoted to Marshawn Lynch on traditional runs, which is problematic (and why the zone read and Seattle present problems to opposing defenses)
Show examples of Revis making a good play – patience is combined with his elite athleticism, range, and instincts
Quarter 3 – interception and pass breakup pretty close together
Very good offense, versatile
Like their defense, Belichick will mold it to attack the weakness of the opposing defense.
The problem is, it is hard to identify the Seahawks weakness
They have great DBs and a great front, often with 8 in the box (base cover 3) to take away the run.
One thing that is possible, because the Seahawks are a zone heavy team, is to get your players matched up on the defenders that you want them matched up against
Seattle rarely swaps cornerbacks (though they did play more man coverage against the Packers)
Look for Belichick to use Gronkowski in creative ways to try to isolate him in a favorable matchup – he is always creative with Gronk and Gronk is his most dangerous weapon.
The Patriots might look to the Chargers film
The Chargers beat the Seahawks by taking advantage of their great tight end – Antonio Gates. They often did this with trips formations. Trips formations force the defense to either compensate to the trips side and leave a favorable matchup on the one receiver side, or help with the one receiver side and give away numbers to the trips side.
This is a way that the Patriots may look to get Gronkowski in favorable matchups.
Gronkowski quarter 3 touchdown
Trips away from him – can get Gronk isolated away from Sherman
Simple slant, but Gronk is so big and athletic, the pass is perfect, hard to defend
Blount TD 3rd quarter – good solid football, line up and pound you – bodies on bodies up front, Blount finishes with authority – a big back who runs with power
Shows that the Patriots are a rare offense that can really shift identities from week to week – one week they are rushing for a ton of yards in an old school power/traditional NFL offense, the next week they are basically running a spread offense.
Patriots have versatile players to create personnel problems for defense
I.e. with Vereen and Gronkowski in the game, no telling if they will align in a traditional running formation or in a 5 wide spread
Though, as further explained below, the Seahawks are a simple defense that doesn’t really care what the opposition does – they will adjust and not be caught off guard.
Simplicity of Seahawks defense makes it less likely to be fooled by eligible/ineligible tactics
The Seahawks are in base so often that they can focus entirely on any exotic looks
Best unit on the field – an all time great defense
Execution defense – they do not run a ton of stuff, they just do what they do really well
Quarterbacks like Brady and Manning are so great because they can figure out exactly what a defense is doing – the defense tries to outsmart them and those quarterbacks pick them apart
But that doesn’t matter against the Seahawks. Brady says: “I know what you are doing.” The Seahawks say: “So what? Try to beat us.” That is what happened last year with the Broncos in the Super Bowl and the Seahawks dominated (and people forget, the Broncos were an all time great offense going into that game).
THE SIMPLICITY OF THE SEAHAWKS DEFENSE IS A HUGE POSITIVE!!!!!
It is common to think that more complex is better. But the simplicity of the Seattle defense allows them to play faster, execute better, and adjust to anything the offense sends at them. They are much less likely to be “caught” in the “wrong” defense than complicated defenses.
Brady has, in the past, struggled against teams who can effectively rush the passer with their defensive line (i.e. do not have to bring pressure) – think of Giants teams in the Super Bowl, who were built upon the foundation of their defensive lines.
Seahawks are such a team – their defensive line is versatile, fast, and dynamic – and they don’t even have all of their best players – great scheme and talent to meet that scheme.
Linebackers are also terrific – tons of speed – Wagner is one of the best in the game.
Richard Sherman interception first Packers drive – coach’s film
Amazing patience, technique, intelligence, closing speed, meets the ball at the highest point, great body control
Quarterbacks need to be kind of machines when processing information, if the receiver has good leverage, the QB is machine-like in processing that information and taking advantage – but Sherman can recover with his rare size/athleticism combination for the position.
This is why he is so great and such a great fit for the defense
Also shows their base cover 3
1st quarter stop of Eddie Lacy on second drive (4th play)
Shows why Earl Thomas is so great – cornerback speed, fills exceptionally fast and hits for keeps – closest player in the NFL these days to Ronnie Lott – Lott started as a cornerback – Thomas has that kind of speed and range as well – not to mention the intensity and hitting ability.
Seahawks do not stay blocked and this is why they are great against the run – it isn’t because of a magical scheme – they play fast and don’t stay blocked and fly to the ball (cliché, but true for them)
The Packers had a chance to put the game away early, but the Seattle D stood tall and kept the Seahawks in the game
If you like defense, this really is one of the best of all time to watch
I’m not going to spend much time on it, but yes, throwing and hanging on to a deflated ball can provide an advantage.
We do not know the facts of the case, so we can’t know the effect it will have on the Patriots – if they really have been using deflated balls for years, this could hurt them – you never want your first experience with a “new” ball to be in a big game. If this was a one time thing/accidental, it may have zero effect on the Patriots. We do not know the facts
Odd statistic: the Seahawks have not beaten a team with a healthy starting quarterback and which ended with a winning record since week three.
Very obscure sounding statistic, but also crazy how well their schedule played out – they played some bad teams, played the Cardinals a few times with injured quarterbacks, the 49ers were down this season, Rodgers was hurt in their playoff game. The last time they played against a winning team with a healthy starting QB was the Chiefs – loss. Their record against winning record teams with healthy starting QBs: 2-3 (wins in week 1 v Packers and week 3 v Broncos, losses to Chiefs, Cowboys, and Chargers…also a loss to Rams).
They have been dominant on defense, but this is the best argument against them. The Patriots are the best test they’ve faced since those early season games.
They are – no doubt – one of the best defenses of all time, and of course had no control over their schedule – they have knocked down everything in front of them down the stretch of the season.
If they were to lose, this will probably be a statistic people will point to in hindsight. If they win, it was meaningless.
Seahawks have the best unit on the field (defense), but the Patriots have a very good offense and defense. Seahawks offense serves the team well – ball control, great running back, underrated wide receivers (perhaps because of perception because they weren’t drafted high), quarterback who has made many big plays in key moments…but is less consistent than the other units in the game.
The great matchup is all time great Brady against all time great Seattle defense…BUT…it is very intriguing to see how Belichick will try to take away the zone read, and if Seattle can either defeat that strategy or generate offense in other ways. I think everyone who came here tonight knew that Brady v the Seattle defense was the all time great matchup, but hopefully now you can see why the Seattle offense v Patriots defense matchup is also intriguing.
Chip Kelly is considered the NFL’s current innovative “genius.” But it is no secret that the bulk of Kelly’s offense is based upon basic, fundamentally sound, and proven schematics. When combined with spread principles and the up tempo pace of Kelly’s offense (and his practices), those proven schematics are the basis for Kelly’s attack.
Along those lines, one of Kelly’s favorite pass concepts is a football classic: the waggle pass. This play – and the space it creates for quarterback and receivers alike – is one reason why Kelly has been able to plug in multiple quarterbacks to his system with great success (Mark Sanchez taking over for Nick Foles being just the latest example), which is one reason why he tops my list of coaches who could make a cheap, interchangeable quarterback system work (see here). Though it is unclear if Kelly derived the concept directly from the waggle (or one of the many related plays and variations of play action and bootleg concepts), the plays are identical in many ways, most importantly in their ability to put multiple defenders in conflict.
The roots of the waggle pass are in the Delaware Wing T, developed by Dave Nelson in the 1950s. Since that time, the Wing T has been among the most influential offenses in American football, and is still one of the most common and successful offenses in the sport. At the heart of that offense is the waggle pass.
The classic Wing T waggle features buck sweep action to the right. The potency of the buck sweep demands respect. After the quarterback and the running back sell the fake, the quarterback boots to his left. There, the playside receiver usually runs a vertical route, while multiple backside receivers run crossing routes. The quarterback has a run pass option. The linebackers and safeties in particular are stressed by the play: they must respect the buck sweep action (which demands quick pursuit), while receivers cross their face to the opposite side of the field. The crossing patterns are difficult against either man or zone: against man, the receivers cross face and run away from defenders whose momentum may have started in the wrong direction; against zone, the leveled crossing routes take advantage of whether the linebackers and safeties react strong to the run, or drop too deep.
A “traditional” Wing T waggle pass (for further reading on the traditional waggle pass, see the great bucksweep.com for “The Waggle the Best Play in Football,” here):
Now, look at this Eagles touchdown from their Thanksgiving day victory over the Dallas Cowboys:
The Eagles’ waggle schematics. Notice the similarities to the traditional waggle pass. The Eagles fake their top running play (outside zone) to the right. The offensive line washes the defensive line to the right. Sanchez keeps to the left, while he has a playside comeback route and two deep crossing routes to choose from.
All 8 defenders in the Cowboys’ front react towards the run fake. Jordan Matthews, who will catch the touchdown pass, is moving in the other direction.
The tight view gives a closer look at linebackers in conflict. Both box linebackers react towards the run, while Matthews is primed to sneak behind them.
We see the traditional waggle quarterback run/pass option as Sanchez breaks the pocket. Though Sanchez is not a notorious run threat, he had already scored one rushing touchdown on the day. Defensive back C.J. Spillman (#37) reacts up towards this action, leaving a clear path for Matthews to glide behind. Furthermore, Sanchez has clear sight lines down the field – better than a quarterback could ever get from inside the pocket (another reason why Kelly’s quarterbacks thrive).
From a different angle, we see the space Matthews has as Sanchez breaks the pocket.
Just after catching the ball, we see that Matthews still has space, and a clear path to the end zone. An easy pattern with an easy quarterback read leads to the type of decision and throw that has allowed Kelly to find success with a myriad of quarterbacks.
From a different angle, we see the clear path that makes it easy to celebrate before the ball crosses the goal line.
Chip Kelly has enjoyed great success with quarterbacks on the national stage at the University of Oregon and with the Philadelphia Eagles, often with overlooked or – in the case of Mark Sanchez – discarded players. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it isn’t because he employs a rocket science system that confounds defenses. It is the packaging of simple, proven concepts – such as the waggle pass – in spread formations, executed to perfection and with great pace, that creates easy reads and open space for his quarterbacks to thrive.
The quarterback position is perhaps the hardest to play – and coach – in all sports. Few players have mastered the position, and even fewer coaches have mastered the art of finding, teaching, and producing quarterbacks who succeed at the NFL level.
Bill Walsh and Jim Harbaugh are two such coaches. Bill Walsh has produced Hall of Fame NFL quarterbacks as a head coach (Joe Montana, Steve Young), but also maximized the potential of several quarterbacks as an assistant coach in the NFL and as a head coach in college (Virgil Carter, Ken Anderson, Guy Benjamin, Steve Dils). Jim Harbaugh has, in his short career, produced NFL quarterbacks at both of his college stops, turning University of San Diego’s lightly recruited Josh Johnson into an NFL quarterback, recruiting to Stanford and producing star NFL quarterback Andrew Luck, resurrecting the career of Alex Smith of the 49ers, and channeling the raw potential of Colin Kaepernick into a rising star.
Both coaches emphasize the importance of fundamentals. Rather than expand into complex drills and arm mechanics, they ask their quarterbacks to master basic drills. Once mastery is achieved, the quarterbacks continue to work on the same fundamentals in order to maintain their skill in a constant search for perfection. This mastery breeds confidence, and confidence is essential for the position.
In 2013, the consensus top two teams in the NFL (Seahawks, 49ers) were led by young quarterbacks on their rookie contracts. In 2012, the Super Bowl contestants were led by young quarterbacks who hadn’t yet signed monster extensions (Ravens, 49ers).
Contrary to popular wisdom that says the key to winning a Super Bowl is a star veteran quarterback, recent history is filled with examples of young, inexpensive quarterbacks leading their team to victory: Russell Wilson, Joe Flacco, Aaron Rodgers, Ben Roethlisberger (his first championship), Tom Brady (his first championship, though Drew Bledsoe was on the roster), and Kurt Warner.
The key reason for this phenomenon is obvious: the cheaper the quarterback, the more money available to pay the remainder of the roster. A team with a decent, cheap quarterback has the best of both worlds: they have quality at the most important position on the field, but also have more cap freedom than teams with established quarterbacks. The Seahawks and 49ers both exemplified this point. Both quarterbacks were on rookie contracts. The remainder of each roster was loaded with stars. The offensive and defensive lines of both teams were dominant. Each had a star running back. The 49ers had all time great group of linebackers and a solid secondary, while the Seahawks had a solid set of linebackers and an all time great group of defensive backs. Both had expensive, dangerous pass catchers. And the quarterbacks played great – Wilson making the correct decisions and key plays to win a Super Bowl, and Kaepernick at times putting his offense on his back. More relevant to this conversation, the young quarterbacks played in systems that were designed to capitalize on their strengths and which did not rely primarily on them throwing a multitude of traditional drop back pocket passes each game.
The cautionary tale for what can happen after a Super Bowl victory is the Baltimore Ravens of 2013. Fresh off of their championship, Joe Flacco commanded a salary ($120 million) commensurate with other Super Bowl winning quarterbacks. This salary in effect pushed his most dependable target – Anquan Boldin – out the door. This was one key reason why the Ravens finished their Super Bowl defense at 8-8, 3rd in their division, and missed the playoffs.
The Seahawks won the Super Bowl with an all time great defense, a strong running game, and a young quarterback on his rookie contract who made key throws and did not make mistakes. They will soon need to pay that quarterback. It is no coincidence that they let key Super Bowl contributors walk in the offseason, such as Golden Tate, Red Bryant, Chris Clemons, Clinton McDonald, and Breno Giacomini.
Of course, most teams feel “stuck” to pay such a quarterback, at the expense of the rest of their roster.
But what if an NFL team decided against doing so? What if they refused to pay a quarterback more than any other position on the field? Is it possible that a coach and organization would say, for example, that we will never pay a quarterback more than $10 million per year? That we will build a superior team and system, so that we are confident in our ability to win without a traditional “franchise” quarterback? That we can create a system where the quarterback is easily replaced, and that the fortunes of our team will not rest so heavily on one position?
At first glance, this seems unlikely. But the NFL is changing. College systems and coaches were not supposed to succeed in the NFL. Yet in the last two years, the pistol offense (Redskins, 49ers to some extent) and its variation of the veer option (which is often mislabeled as the “read” option, and differs in that the first man on or outside the play side tackle is the option key, as opposed to a backside defender on the read option) has thrived. The 49ers scored 3 touchdowns on the veer scheme in the 2011 NFC Championship against the Falcons, while Robert Griffin III excelled in his rookie season primarily operating out of the pistol. Next, Chip Kelly brought his hurry up spread offense to the NFL. It proved effective with two quarterbacks who contrast one another in almost every way – Michael Vick and Nick Foles – as the Eagles exceeded expectations in making the playoffs.
We know that the rarest commodity in football is the top flight drop back passer. In any given season, there are 10-15 men on the planet who prove capable of successfully operating a traditional NFL passing offense as the focal point of that offense. Installing an offense that can take advantage of a non traditional, interchangeable quarterback would be a huge risk. But perhaps the bigger risk is continuing to hit one’s head against the wall, when decades of evidence show that operating a “pro” style offense requires a commodity that less than half of the teams possess at any given time. And even the teams who do possess a competent quarterback are one injury away from disaster.
In part two, we will look at the systems and coaches who could work with a cheaper, “interchangeable” quarterback system, from Chip Kelly’s zone blocking spread to Gus Malzahn’s wing t spread to Jim Harbaugh’s power scheme to the pistol to a variation of the split back veer to the run and shoot and the Air Raid craze.
Peyton Manning has long used basic and proven concepts in maintaining his status as one of the NFL’s all time great quarterbacks. The following play from the 2013 AFC Championship game exemplifies the tools he uses to gain information about the defense in order to maximize his team’s chances for success on any given play.
Figure one (below) shows the Broncos in a 5 wide receiver formation, with running back Knowshon Moreno split wide to the left. To the top of the screen, there are three defenders aligned over three receivers, with safety Devin McCourty outside the hash over the top. To the bottom of the screen, however, there is one defender (cornerback Aqib Talib) aligned on Julius Thomas. The second safety (Steve Gregory) splits wide as Moreno walks towards the sideline. Manning has his first clue: he has a numbers disadvantage on his strong side (3 defenders on the line of scrimmage plus 1 safety for 3 receivers) and even numbers on the weak side (1 defender on the line of scrimmage plus 1 safety walking towards the outside to cover 2 receivers).
Next, in what appears to be an innocuous shift, Manning calls Moreno to return to the backfield. As Moreno trots towards Manning’s side, Manning eyes the safety, Gregory. Gregory shades back towards the inside, following Moreno.
Taken in a single snapshot (below), there is no telling what this two high coverage is: it could be cover 2, or cover 2 man, or cover 4, or a safety could drop into the box in a cover 3 or man free (not to mention the many possible split field coverage). But Moreno’s shift and Gregory’s movement has Manning thinking – and hoping – for one thing: that Gregory is in man coverage with Moreno, leaving Aqib Talib alone in man coverage against the bigger Julius Thomas with half a field of space to work with.
Manning gets confirmation of his hopes soon after the snap. Gregory runs towards Moreno, his momentum simultaneously telling Manning that he is in man coverage on Moreno and eliminating him as a possibility to defense Thomas. McCourty is still outside the opposite hash, giving Manning and Thomas the half field of space to work with that they wanted.
As Manning prepares to throw the ball (below), we see Thomas winning leverage to the inside. McCourty is now reading Manning, but he does not have the time to recover to help Talib.
Much has been made of Manning’s declining arm strength. But with his timing, accuracy, and anticipation, he has all the arm that he needs. The ball is accurate and on time. As predicted, Thomas catches the ball before McCourty can make a play.
Everything Peyton Manning does on the field has a purpose in his effort to gain an advantage over the defense. Next time you see a seemingly innocuous shift or motion, watch how the defense reacts, and try to see the clues that Manning sees. It gives insight into the mind of one of the most unique players to ever play the game, and how he maintains (if not improves upon) his level of excellence despite his increasing age and declining physical gifts.