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Jan 202015
 

Don’t listen to the talking heads who say otherwise. The zone read is not dead.

Common, uninformed, regurgitated, and recycled arguments regarding option football in the NFL are as follows: it is a gimmick that cannot last, the speed of NFL defenses is too much for it, and NFL defensive coordinators are too smart to allow it to succeed.

The continued success of option concepts in the NFL proves such arguments to be ignorant.

The 2014/15 Seattle Seahawks are the latest example. Doubters still existed (or, perhaps more accurately, overlooked Seattle’s reliance on the zone read) even after Russell Wilson ran for 849 yards (16th in the league) on 7.2 yards per carry, Marshawn Lynch ran for 1,306 yards (4th in the league), and the Seahawks led the NFL in rushing by more than 400 yards en route to a 12-4 record and the #1 seed in the NFC.

The zone read is built on solid fundamentals – it is a zone run with a quarterback “read” of a designated defender on the backside, which either “blocks” the option key by forcing him to respect the quarterback run, or opens a running lane for the quarterback if the defender chases the running back. In equation form, zone read = zone run + quarterback option to run. If you believe that the zone run is here to stay (and you should, as it has thrived in the NFL for decades), there is no reason that the zone read should not also function well with appropriate quarterbacks (i.e., those with speed). See here for a more in depth discussion of the simplicity and fundamentals behind the zone read.

The Seahawks’ comeback victory over the Green Bay Packers in the NFC Championship game should leave no doubt that the zone read will continue to be a successful NFL scheme.

Both of the Seahawks’ final regulation touchdowns came on the zone read – the first by Russell Wilson, the next by Marshawn Lynch. They leaned heavily on variations of the play down the stretch, incorporating the complimentary waggle pass (see here for an in depth description of the waggle concept).

If the zone read were a “gimmick” that NFL defenses could easily solve, the Packers were the one team who should have solved the problem by this point. Two seasons ago, the Packers were thrashed by Colin Kaepernick and the 49ers’ option attack (see here to differentiate between the “read option” and the veer scheme) in being eliminated from the playoffs.  Last season, they fell to those same 49ers at home in the playoffs.  Kaepernick ran for a total of 279 yards in those two games (181 and 98, respectively).  And here the Packers were again, with years to “solve” the option game, giving up two option touchdowns in under a minute as the Seahawks went to their zone read in the biggest moments and with the clock winding down.

Lynch goes for 14 yards on the first play of the drive. The option key plays it well, square to the line, ready to play Wilson and help with Lynch, but is ultimately "blocked" by the threat of Wilson running.

Lynch goes for 14 yards on the first play of the drive. The option key plays it well, square to the line, ready to play Wilson and help with Lynch, but is ultimately “blocked” by the threat of Wilson running.

The Seahawks have bodies on bodies, allowing Lynch to exploit a crease up the middle.

The Seahawks have bodies on bodies, allowing Lynch to exploit a crease up the middle.

Later in the drive, Wilson makes a questionable (unless it was a designed handoff or he was reading the defensive back) read (the option key's shoulders are turned perpendicular to the line, meaning that he cannot react to a Wilson keep, and can chase Lynch from behind).  Because the zone read is based on solid fundamentals, however, Lynch stills gains four yards.  Wilson's incorrect read became a traditional inside zone play (and any option coach will tell you that they do not expect their quarterbacks to be perfect on their reads; 75% is excellent.  The shotgun alignment, which provides the quarterback with more space for his read than a traditional under center veer scheme, should increase the quarterback's "good read" percentage).

Later in the drive, Wilson makes a questionable (unless it was a designed handoff or he was reading the defensive back) read (the option key’s shoulders are turned perpendicular to the line, meaning that he cannot react to a Wilson keep, and can chase Lynch from behind). Because the zone read is based on solid fundamentals, however, Lynch stills gains four yards. Wilson’s incorrect read became a traditional inside zone play (and any option coach will tell you that they do not expect their quarterbacks to be perfect on their reads; 75% is excellent. The shotgun alignment, which provides the quarterback with more space for his read than a traditional under center veer scheme, should increase the quarterback’s “good read” percentage).

 On third and goal, Wilson makes the correct read: two defenders have their shoulders turned perpendicular to the line, so Wilson keeps and glides into the end zone with ease.


On third and goal, Wilson makes the correct read: two defenders have their shoulders turned perpendicular to the line, so Wilson keeps and glides into the end zone with ease.

Easy path to the end zone.

Easy path to the end zone.

After a successful onside kick, the Seahawks start where they left off, with the zone read.  Here, Julius Peppers - one of the best defensive ends in NFL history - doesn't play it poorly.  He shuffles down the line with his shoulders parallel to the line, giving him the chance to play both options.  But his momentum down the line is too much.  Wilson keeps, starting the drive with a 15 yard gain.  Imagine how many talking heads would scoff at the notion of an NFL team starting a make or break, NFC Championship, two minute drill drive, with only one timeout remaining, with an option run.

After a successful onside kick, the Seahawks start where they left off, with the zone read. Here, Julius Peppers – one of the best defensive ends in NFL history – doesn’t play it poorly. He shuffles down the line with his shoulders parallel to the line, giving him the chance to play both options. But his momentum down the line is too much. Wilson keeps, starting the drive with a 15 yard gain. Imagine how many talking heads would scoff at the notion of an NFL team starting a make or break, NFC Championship, two minute drill drive, with only one timeout remaining, with an option run.

Wilson exploits the wide open space.

Wilson exploits the wide open space.

On the next play, the Seahawks - not surprisingly - went to the zone read again.  Here, the Packers play it perfectly - note how every front 7 player has his shoulders square to the line, the option key muddying Wilson's read while having the ability to react to either option.  Lynch still gains 3 on the play.

On the next play, the Seahawks – not surprisingly – went to the zone read again. Here, the Packers play it perfectly – note how every front 7 player has his shoulders square to the line, the option key muddying Wilson’s read while having the ability to react to either option. Lynch still gains 3 on the play.

Two plays later, the Seahawks go to - you guessed it - the zone read.  Note all of the Green Bay eyes on Wilson as he carries out his fake.  Lynch exploits the ensuing opening for a 24 yard touchdown run.

Two plays later, the Seahawks go to – you guessed it – the zone read. Note all of the Green Bay eyes on Wilson as he carries out his fake. Lynch exploits the ensuing opening for a 24 yard touchdown run.

Lynch breaks through the line with daylight ahead...

Lynch breaks through the line with daylight ahead…

Lynch is able to turn and walk backwards into the end zone.

Lynch is able to turn and walk backwards into the end zone.

Think about it: a 2 minute drill in the NFC championship game, and the Seahawks needed 4 plays to complete a go ahead touchdown. 3 of those 4 plays were zone reads. The Seahawks acted like a Madden player who found an unstoppable play, going to it repeatedly, even in hurry up situations.

On their opening drive to win overtime, care to guess what concept the Seahawks featured? 4 of the 6 plays were zone read or built off of the zone read, and, arguably, the success of the zone read led to the 0 safety alignment that left the middle of the field open for a perfect Russell Wilson throw to Jermaine Kearse.

On the first play of the drive, the Packers played the zone read well, the option key again eying Wilson with patience (but, again, this is also the purpose of the zone read, as Wilson has essentially "blocked" the defender). The play became a traditional zone run, and Lynch gains 4 yards.

On the first play of the drive, the Packers played the zone read well, the option key again eying Wilson with patience (but, again, this is also the purpose of the zone read, as Wilson has essentially “blocked” the defender). The play became a traditional zone run, and Lynch gains 4 yards.

Finally, we see the complimentary zone read pass, the waggle (you can read much more about how this concept fits into a zone read scheme here).  Notice how Wilson, Lynch, and the line appear the same to the defense as they do on a zone read play.  We can see the defense inching up in respect of the run, while Baldwin is hidden behind the line as he crosses towards the right flat.

Finally, we see the complimentary zone read pass, the waggle. Notice how Wilson, Lynch, and the line appear the same to the defense as they do on a zone read play. We can see the defense inching up in respect of the run, while Baldwin is hidden behind the line as he crosses towards the right flat.

Wilson lofts the ball to Baldwin as the defense struggles to catch up.  Baldwin goes for 10 yards on the play.

Wilson lofts the ball to Baldwin as the defense struggles to catch up. Baldwin goes for 10 yards on the play.

On the third play of the drive, the Seahawks again go to the zone read.  The Packers play it well, and Lynch gains 4 yards.

On the third play of the drive, the Seahawks again go to the zone read. The Packers play it well, and Lynch gains 4 yards.

Next, the Seahawks go back to the waggle concept.  The Packers play good defense again, and Wilson is sacked by Peppers for a 1 yard loss.  This was the final appearance of the zone read or a zone read concept in the game (which would be over in two plays), but the effect of the Seahawks running game played a large role in the finish.

Next, the Seahawks go back to the waggle concept. The Packers play good defense again, and Wilson is sacked by Peppers for a 1 yard loss. This was the final appearance of the zone read or a zone read concept in the game (which would be over in two plays), but the effect of the Seahawks running game played a large role in the finish.

On first down after a 35 yard pass to Doug Baldwin, the Seahawks substitute heavy personnel into the game - two tight ends, a fullback (who shifts to a wide receiver position on the left), a running back, and a lone receiver - Kearse.  The Packers - expecting a run and responding to the heavy personnel - react by bringing both safeties into the box.  They align with 9 defenders within 6 yards of the ball, leaving both cornerbacks with no deep help.  The center of the field is vacated, and in that void Wilson sees victory.

On first down after a 35 yard pass to Doug Baldwin, the Seahawks substitute heavy personnel into the game – two tight ends, a fullback (who shifts to a wide receiver position on the left), a running back, and a lone receiver – Kearse. The Packers – expecting a run and responding to the heavy personnel – react by bringing both safeties into the box. They align with 9 defenders within 6 yards of the ball, leaving both cornerbacks with no deep help. The center of the field is vacated, and in that void Wilson sees victory.

No help in the middle, a perfect throw by Wilson, and a great catch by Kearse equals victory over good man coverage.

No help in the middle, a perfect throw by Wilson, and a great catch by Kearse equals victory over good man coverage.

The Seahawks are going to their second straight Super Bowl on the strength of their zone read game. The Packers are going home for the third straight season at the hands of a zone read centric team.

The zone read is not a magic bullet. It is good, fundamentally sound football.

The zone read is alive and well, and it is here to stay.

May 272014
 

Perhaps the most explosive running play in the modern era of football is the veer triple option. From the time that Bill Yeoman’s Houston Cougars broke records with the play in the 1960s until the present day – peaking with the 49ers scoring 3 touchdowns in the 2012 NFC championship while using a variation of the scheme – it continues to rack up yards.

But related concepts appeared even before Yeoman’s day. Don Faurot may, in fact, have been the originator of the triple option, using it to power his Split-T Missouri backfield to great success in the 1940s. The video below displays the basic concepts that would power all future veer schemes: not blocking certain defenders in order to gain more blocking downfield and to give the offense a 3 on 2 or 2 on 1 advantage, similar to the fast breaks in basketball that influenced Faurot’s innovation. The footage – slowed due to the cameras of the time – shows the unblocked defenders steaming into the backfield while the dive back rushes ahead or the quarterback pitches behind (and notice the underhanded “pitch”).

Faurot coached the Iowa Pre-Flight Seahawks during the World War II years, where he had an assistant coach named Bud Wilkinson. Wilkinson took the Split-T (and it’s signature option) with him to Oklahoma. There, the offense powered the Sooners to a 47-game winning streak from 1953 to 1957, an NCAA Division I record that still stands today.

The following video shows the 1955 Oklahoma Sooners season highlights:

Bill Yeoman invented the veer offense at Houston in 1964. His offense went on to lead the nation in offense for three straight years, and led the country in scoring in 1968. For anyone looking to implement the veer, the 1968 playbook remains a masterpiece. There is no better source for understanding the offense:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/2939669/1968-Houston-Veer

The veer scheme eventually powered the wishbone offense. The final wishbone powerhouse were the Oklahoma Sooners and Barry Switzer, who used it to win 3 national championships and 12 Big Eight titles. They also set the all time single game rushing record of 768 yards, as seen here:

The flexbone later grew out of the wishbone. The most notable current flexbone coach is Paul Johnson. This blog post details Johnson’s “If then” play calling methodology. This methodology is not only valuable to coaches looking to run veer based option offenses, but to any coaches who are looking for a methodology to systematically call their plays in order to exploit weaknesses in a defense.

http://footballislifeblog.blogspot.dk/2011/07/paul-johnsons-if-then-methodology-to.html

Perhaps the most famous current split back veer team is the De La Salle Spartans, known for their record 151 game winning streak. The highlights below show the birth of that win streak and display the speed and downfield blocking that continue to exemplify the Spartans.

In the following link, the architect of that team – Bob Ladouceur – details the ideals that formed the Spartans juggernaut. The article is not veer specific (though it does discuss the offense in some detail), but is essential team building material.

http://fastandfuriousfootball.com/wp-content/uploads/coachingmaterial2/De%20La%20Salle%20High%20Motivation.pdf

Finally, the most modern variation may only be a distant relative of the split back veer, but still incorporates the dive back, and the unblocked defender as the first man on or outside the tackle. Here, Colin Kaepernick uses the veer scheme several times during his record 181 yard rushing game against the Green Bay Packers.