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Jan 202015
 

Don’t listen to the talking heads who say otherwise. The zone read is not dead.

Common, uninformed, regurgitated, and recycled arguments regarding option football in the NFL are as follows: it is a gimmick that cannot last, the speed of NFL defenses is too much for it, and NFL defensive coordinators are too smart to allow it to succeed.

The continued success of option concepts in the NFL proves such arguments to be ignorant.

The 2014/15 Seattle Seahawks are the latest example. Doubters still existed (or, perhaps more accurately, overlooked Seattle’s reliance on the zone read) even after Russell Wilson ran for 849 yards (16th in the league) on 7.2 yards per carry, Marshawn Lynch ran for 1,306 yards (4th in the league), and the Seahawks led the NFL in rushing by more than 400 yards en route to a 12-4 record and the #1 seed in the NFC.

The zone read is built on solid fundamentals – it is a zone run with a quarterback “read” of a designated defender on the backside, which either “blocks” the option key by forcing him to respect the quarterback run, or opens a running lane for the quarterback if the defender chases the running back. In equation form, zone read = zone run + quarterback option to run. If you believe that the zone run is here to stay (and you should, as it has thrived in the NFL for decades), there is no reason that the zone read should not also function well with appropriate quarterbacks (i.e., those with speed). See here for a more in depth discussion of the simplicity and fundamentals behind the zone read.

The Seahawks’ comeback victory over the Green Bay Packers in the NFC Championship game should leave no doubt that the zone read will continue to be a successful NFL scheme.

Both of the Seahawks’ final regulation touchdowns came on the zone read – the first by Russell Wilson, the next by Marshawn Lynch. They leaned heavily on variations of the play down the stretch, incorporating the complimentary waggle pass (see here for an in depth description of the waggle concept).

If the zone read were a “gimmick” that NFL defenses could easily solve, the Packers were the one team who should have solved the problem by this point. Two seasons ago, the Packers were thrashed by Colin Kaepernick and the 49ers’ option attack (see here to differentiate between the “read option” and the veer scheme) in being eliminated from the playoffs.  Last season, they fell to those same 49ers at home in the playoffs.  Kaepernick ran for a total of 279 yards in those two games (181 and 98, respectively).  And here the Packers were again, with years to “solve” the option game, giving up two option touchdowns in under a minute as the Seahawks went to their zone read in the biggest moments and with the clock winding down.

Lynch goes for 14 yards on the first play of the drive. The option key plays it well, square to the line, ready to play Wilson and help with Lynch, but is ultimately "blocked" by the threat of Wilson running.

Lynch goes for 14 yards on the first play of the drive. The option key plays it well, square to the line, ready to play Wilson and help with Lynch, but is ultimately “blocked” by the threat of Wilson running.

The Seahawks have bodies on bodies, allowing Lynch to exploit a crease up the middle.

The Seahawks have bodies on bodies, allowing Lynch to exploit a crease up the middle.

Later in the drive, Wilson makes a questionable (unless it was a designed handoff or he was reading the defensive back) read (the option key's shoulders are turned perpendicular to the line, meaning that he cannot react to a Wilson keep, and can chase Lynch from behind).  Because the zone read is based on solid fundamentals, however, Lynch stills gains four yards.  Wilson's incorrect read became a traditional inside zone play (and any option coach will tell you that they do not expect their quarterbacks to be perfect on their reads; 75% is excellent.  The shotgun alignment, which provides the quarterback with more space for his read than a traditional under center veer scheme, should increase the quarterback's "good read" percentage).

Later in the drive, Wilson makes a questionable (unless it was a designed handoff or he was reading the defensive back) read (the option key’s shoulders are turned perpendicular to the line, meaning that he cannot react to a Wilson keep, and can chase Lynch from behind). Because the zone read is based on solid fundamentals, however, Lynch stills gains four yards. Wilson’s incorrect read became a traditional inside zone play (and any option coach will tell you that they do not expect their quarterbacks to be perfect on their reads; 75% is excellent. The shotgun alignment, which provides the quarterback with more space for his read than a traditional under center veer scheme, should increase the quarterback’s “good read” percentage).

 On third and goal, Wilson makes the correct read: two defenders have their shoulders turned perpendicular to the line, so Wilson keeps and glides into the end zone with ease.


On third and goal, Wilson makes the correct read: two defenders have their shoulders turned perpendicular to the line, so Wilson keeps and glides into the end zone with ease.

Easy path to the end zone.

Easy path to the end zone.

After a successful onside kick, the Seahawks start where they left off, with the zone read.  Here, Julius Peppers - one of the best defensive ends in NFL history - doesn't play it poorly.  He shuffles down the line with his shoulders parallel to the line, giving him the chance to play both options.  But his momentum down the line is too much.  Wilson keeps, starting the drive with a 15 yard gain.  Imagine how many talking heads would scoff at the notion of an NFL team starting a make or break, NFC Championship, two minute drill drive, with only one timeout remaining, with an option run.

After a successful onside kick, the Seahawks start where they left off, with the zone read. Here, Julius Peppers – one of the best defensive ends in NFL history – doesn’t play it poorly. He shuffles down the line with his shoulders parallel to the line, giving him the chance to play both options. But his momentum down the line is too much. Wilson keeps, starting the drive with a 15 yard gain. Imagine how many talking heads would scoff at the notion of an NFL team starting a make or break, NFC Championship, two minute drill drive, with only one timeout remaining, with an option run.

Wilson exploits the wide open space.

Wilson exploits the wide open space.

On the next play, the Seahawks - not surprisingly - went to the zone read again.  Here, the Packers play it perfectly - note how every front 7 player has his shoulders square to the line, the option key muddying Wilson's read while having the ability to react to either option.  Lynch still gains 3 on the play.

On the next play, the Seahawks – not surprisingly – went to the zone read again. Here, the Packers play it perfectly – note how every front 7 player has his shoulders square to the line, the option key muddying Wilson’s read while having the ability to react to either option. Lynch still gains 3 on the play.

Two plays later, the Seahawks go to - you guessed it - the zone read.  Note all of the Green Bay eyes on Wilson as he carries out his fake.  Lynch exploits the ensuing opening for a 24 yard touchdown run.

Two plays later, the Seahawks go to – you guessed it – the zone read. Note all of the Green Bay eyes on Wilson as he carries out his fake. Lynch exploits the ensuing opening for a 24 yard touchdown run.

Lynch breaks through the line with daylight ahead...

Lynch breaks through the line with daylight ahead…

Lynch is able to turn and walk backwards into the end zone.

Lynch is able to turn and walk backwards into the end zone.

Think about it: a 2 minute drill in the NFC championship game, and the Seahawks needed 4 plays to complete a go ahead touchdown. 3 of those 4 plays were zone reads. The Seahawks acted like a Madden player who found an unstoppable play, going to it repeatedly, even in hurry up situations.

On their opening drive to win overtime, care to guess what concept the Seahawks featured? 4 of the 6 plays were zone read or built off of the zone read, and, arguably, the success of the zone read led to the 0 safety alignment that left the middle of the field open for a perfect Russell Wilson throw to Jermaine Kearse.

On the first play of the drive, the Packers played the zone read well, the option key again eying Wilson with patience (but, again, this is also the purpose of the zone read, as Wilson has essentially "blocked" the defender). The play became a traditional zone run, and Lynch gains 4 yards.

On the first play of the drive, the Packers played the zone read well, the option key again eying Wilson with patience (but, again, this is also the purpose of the zone read, as Wilson has essentially “blocked” the defender). The play became a traditional zone run, and Lynch gains 4 yards.

Finally, we see the complimentary zone read pass, the waggle (you can read much more about how this concept fits into a zone read scheme here).  Notice how Wilson, Lynch, and the line appear the same to the defense as they do on a zone read play.  We can see the defense inching up in respect of the run, while Baldwin is hidden behind the line as he crosses towards the right flat.

Finally, we see the complimentary zone read pass, the waggle. Notice how Wilson, Lynch, and the line appear the same to the defense as they do on a zone read play. We can see the defense inching up in respect of the run, while Baldwin is hidden behind the line as he crosses towards the right flat.

Wilson lofts the ball to Baldwin as the defense struggles to catch up.  Baldwin goes for 10 yards on the play.

Wilson lofts the ball to Baldwin as the defense struggles to catch up. Baldwin goes for 10 yards on the play.

On the third play of the drive, the Seahawks again go to the zone read.  The Packers play it well, and Lynch gains 4 yards.

On the third play of the drive, the Seahawks again go to the zone read. The Packers play it well, and Lynch gains 4 yards.

Next, the Seahawks go back to the waggle concept.  The Packers play good defense again, and Wilson is sacked by Peppers for a 1 yard loss.  This was the final appearance of the zone read or a zone read concept in the game (which would be over in two plays), but the effect of the Seahawks running game played a large role in the finish.

Next, the Seahawks go back to the waggle concept. The Packers play good defense again, and Wilson is sacked by Peppers for a 1 yard loss. This was the final appearance of the zone read or a zone read concept in the game (which would be over in two plays), but the effect of the Seahawks running game played a large role in the finish.

On first down after a 35 yard pass to Doug Baldwin, the Seahawks substitute heavy personnel into the game - two tight ends, a fullback (who shifts to a wide receiver position on the left), a running back, and a lone receiver - Kearse.  The Packers - expecting a run and responding to the heavy personnel - react by bringing both safeties into the box.  They align with 9 defenders within 6 yards of the ball, leaving both cornerbacks with no deep help.  The center of the field is vacated, and in that void Wilson sees victory.

On first down after a 35 yard pass to Doug Baldwin, the Seahawks substitute heavy personnel into the game – two tight ends, a fullback (who shifts to a wide receiver position on the left), a running back, and a lone receiver – Kearse. The Packers – expecting a run and responding to the heavy personnel – react by bringing both safeties into the box. They align with 9 defenders within 6 yards of the ball, leaving both cornerbacks with no deep help. The center of the field is vacated, and in that void Wilson sees victory.

No help in the middle, a perfect throw by Wilson, and a great catch by Kearse equals victory over good man coverage.

No help in the middle, a perfect throw by Wilson, and a great catch by Kearse equals victory over good man coverage.

The Seahawks are going to their second straight Super Bowl on the strength of their zone read game. The Packers are going home for the third straight season at the hands of a zone read centric team.

The zone read is not a magic bullet. It is good, fundamentally sound football.

The zone read is alive and well, and it is here to stay.

Jan 032015
 

The Dallas Cowboys run game has vaulted them into the playoffs, providing a strong offensive identity for a team that has struggled to break into the elite ranks of the NFL. This run game is nothing revolutionary; to the contrary, it is a simple, zone based scheme. NFL fans often view the word “simple” as an insult – with the apparent conventional thinking being that an offense must be complex and a coach must vary his schemes every week in order to confound defenses. While there is truth to the notion that game planning and varied schematics are essential in the NFL, the 2014 Cowboys achieved success by investing in their offensive line and getting great at their base schemes, and using those base schemes over and over again to open large holes for DeMarco Murray, who led the NFL in rushing by almost 500 yards.

The first thing to note is that – as mentioned above – the Cowboys have invested heavily in their offensive line with high draft picks, and it has paid off. Their line as a unit is agile, smart, and does a great job of sustaining blocks. The second thing to note, however, is that they do not – as a general rule – blow the opposition off the ball. Covering up the defense – aka getting bodies on bodies and taking defenders where the defenders want to go – is more important to their success than is drive blocking those defenders down the field. As illustrated below in their week 14 game against the Chicago Bears, in which Murray ran for his season high of 179 yards, the Cowboys’ offensive linemen took great angles, prevented penetration, were patient with their blocks, and therefore opened numerous creases for Murray and the Cowboys to exploit. It wasn’t rocket science; it was great, sustainable execution.

As Murray receives the inside zone hand off, his line covers up the Chicago defensive line

As Murray receives the inside zone handoff, his line covers up the Chicago defensive line

The Bears haven't been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens up as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders.  Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

The Bears haven’t been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders. Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

Joseph Randle takes the outside zone handoff.  The angles are flatter on the outside zone, but the result is the same: Cowboys blockers engaged with Bears defenders.

Joseph Randle takes the outside zone handoff. The angles are flatter on the outside zone, but the result is the same: Cowboys blockers engaged with Bears defenders.

Once again, a crease develops as Cowboys offensive linemen stay engaged on their blocks, and Randle exploits it for a 17 yard touchdown run.

Once again, a crease develops as Cowboys offensive linemen stay engaged on their blocks, and Randle exploits it for a 17 yard touchdown run.

One of the best plays in the Cowboys run game has been their counter, which has become an essential (and prolific) compliment to their zone game.  Their counter resembles a classic pin and pull scheme, with both guards pulling as the remaining blockers pin down the defenders shaded to the right.  Murray and Tony Romo simulate their initial footwork of the Cowboy zone package to set up the counter.

One of the best plays in the Cowboys run game has been their counter, which has become an essential (and prolific) compliment to their zone game. Their counter resembles a classic pin and pull scheme, with both guards pulling to the left as the remaining blockers pin down the defenders to the right. Murray and Tony Romo simulate their initial footwork of the Cowboy zone package to set up the counter.

Pulling guard Ronald Leary's crushing block highlights another Cowboys victory at the point of attack. Solid offensive line execution and linebacker over-pursuit opens a massive cutback lane, which Murray exploits for a 40 yard gain.

Pulling guard Ronald Leary’s crushing block highlights another Cowboys victory at the point of attack. Solid offensive line execution and linebacker over-pursuit opens a massive cutback lane, which Murray exploits for a 40 yard gain.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone.  A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception here.  Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the ball.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone. A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception on this play. Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the handoff.

Murray prods the hole with patience, and then explodes through another crease forged by his athletic offensive line for a 26 yard gain.

Murray prods the hole with patience, and then explodes through another crease forged by his athletic offensive line for a 26 yard gain.

A great, physical run game does not have to mean blowing the defense off the ball. Intelligence does not have to mean complexity. The Cowboys have based their offensive attack on a few plays that they execute well, once again proving that – even at the highest level of the sport – execution is the most important factor in achieving success. Obviously, they are not as simple as a Pop Warner team. They use a variety of formations and motions and shifts as well as their complimentary passing game to aid in running the ball. But, at their core, they share an important similarity with many lower level powerhouses: they are great at a few things, and everything else builds form there.

Jul 042014
 

The counter sweep is not a common play, but for decades the Nebraska Cornhuskers used it as a primary weapon to power their prolific run game.

The counter sweep is closely related to the counter trey, which became – and remains – a staple in the run game. The blocking schemes look identical at the start of the play, but differ at one key point.

In the counter trey, the pulling guard attempts to kick out the defensive end. The tackle (or sometimes a back) cuts inside of this block to lead the play.

In the counter sweep, the pulling guard “log” blocks the defensive end. This means that – rather than kick the end out – the guard attempts to pin him to the inside. The tackle’s path is deeper in the backfield than on the counter trey, and he goes outside of the guard’s block, looking to lead the play wide and down the field.

The counter trey is a power, off tackle run. The counter action by the backfield seeks to draw the defense in the wrong direction for a split second, which is then exploited by power and numbers at the point of attack.

The counter sweep also attempts to influence the defense to the wrong side of the field, but the play seeks to get the ball carrier as far as possible from the interior of the line.

This resulted in consistent big plays for Nebraska. Of course, Nebraska was also one of the most physical teams in the country, often employing the best offensive lines and the most talented backs. The defense needed to react hard to the play side, and Nebraska exploited that fact by caving in the other side of the line with power, and leading the play with swift, disciplined pulling linemen who were followed by backs who could outrun everyone to the sideline.

While most teams won’t enjoy such advantages, it is surprising that the counter sweep is not employed more often, if nothing more than as a compliment to the counter trey. The two plays go hand in hand. Not surprisingly, Nebraska used a play they called “counter trap” to compliment the counter sweep. Their counter trap featured the guard kicking out the end, and the guard cutting inside of his block – just like the counter trey.

The counter sweep adjustment – at the least – should be installed, to account for a block down step down defensive end. Such an end can be almost impossible to uproot with a kick out block, but is very easy to log block. The tackle and ball carrier should be able to read this block and run to the outside, thus – in effect – executing the famous Nebraska counter sweep.

For video of the Nebraska counter sweep:

For more analysis and video (including the Nebraska counter trap), visit trojanfootballanalysis.com:

http://trojanfootballanalysis.com/?p=55

Jun 192014
 

The trend towards pass first offensive football has generally led to a decrease in run game intricacy. Spread and pass first teams have found that they can put up high point totals with only a few simple run blocking schemes. This approach is sound – with focus on the passing game, the simplified run game means that high levels of execution can be attained on the few blocking schemes that are in the playbook.

This does mean that some concepts of the past have been largely lost. The following play exemplifies the lost art of the complex run game, a tackle trap on a top nose guard (Tony Casillas), intended to make that nose guard’s life difficult while opening a sizeable hole and utilizing angles across the line of scrimmage.

The blocking scheme: Right tackle blocks down on star MLB Brian Bosworth.  Right guard pulls and looks for work. Center posts on star nose guard Tony Casillas, then walls off the defensive tackle.  Left guard goes for the other MLB.  The left tackle pulls and traps Casillas, while the fullback walls the other defensive tackle to the outside.

The blocking scheme: TE walls off the outside.  Right tackle blocks down on star MLB Brian Bosworth. Right guard pulls and looks for work downfield. Center posts on star nose guard Tony Casillas, then walls off the defensive tackle. Left guard goes for the other MLB. The left tackle pulls and traps Casillas, while the fullback walls the other defensive tackle to the outside.

The blocks take advantage of angles, including the smashing trap on Casillas.

The blocks take advantage of angles, including the smashing trap on Casillas.

Casillas is sent to the turf as running back Jacque Robinson (father of NBA star Nate) exploits a wide running lane.

Casillas is sent to the turf as running back Jacque Robinson (father of NBA star Nate) exploits a wide running lane.

Robinson is untouched into the defensive backfield.

Robinson is untouched into the defensive backfield.

Robinson finally faces impact at the goalline.

Robinson finally faces impact at the goalline.

Often, the best offensive system is the one that goes against contemporary trends. Increasingly, teams are finding that the spread offense is not a magic bullet. While the many variations of the spread ARE sound football, defenses are now built to stop them, and those offenses lack the novelty that once made them so difficult to defend.

Perhaps those defenses – built to stop the spread passing game and various zone running schemes – are now susceptible to a return to power running. The Stanford Cardinal under Jim Harbaugh and David Shaw, as well as the San Francisco 49ers under Harbaugh, have capitalized by building swift, powerful lines and incorporating complex run schemes and jumbo personnel packages. Once a staple, those schemes are now the novelty while the spread offense thrives. While mastering the execution of a run game complete with powers and counters and traps and whams and isolations can be difficult, it is more than possible with proper commitment.

The play:

Jun 082014
 

It is always important for an offense to put the defense in conflict.  The throwback screen (note that this is not the only name for this play, but it is what I will use) is a classic – and underutilized – way to do so, particularly for a team that often uses sprint action with its quarterback.

The 1992 Houston Cougars were one such team. A record breaking run and shoot offense, Houston was known for lighting up the scoreboard with an offense that almost always had the quarterback sprinting to one side or the other. Not surprisingly, this forced Houston’s opponents to flow and devote more defenders to that side.  This is where the throwback screen comes into play.

The assignments on the play. The quarterback sprints to the right (as on a typical Houston pass play) while the linemen touch their defensive linemen and go.

The assignments on the play. The quarterback sprints to the right (as on a typical Houston pass play) while the linemen touch their defensive linemen and go.  After making his sprint, the quarterback turns and fires to the wide receiver on the left, who bends inside of the block by the left tackle on the cornerback.

The first step is the sprint itself. The defense must respect this movement and act accordingly to account for the possibility of a quarterback run or receivers flooding in the direction of the sprint.

Texas takes the bait, with the defensive line rushing hard and the linebackers blitzing to pressure the quarterback. Everyone moves in the direction of the quarterback sprint.

Texas takes the bait, with the defensive line rushing hard and the linebackers blitzing to pressure the quarterback. Everyone moves in the direction of the quarterback sprint.

We can see Texas doing just that, with linebackers blitzing and the coverage sliding in the direction of the roll.

All 6 Texas box players are now behind the Houston line, while the Houston offensive linemen move down field to make their blocks.

All 6 Texas box players are now behind the Houston line (wasted on the play), while the Houston offensive linemen move downfield to make their blocks.

This leaves the backside vulnerable.

The left tackle gets just enough of the corner back on a cut block to give the wide receiver a clear lane to the inside

The left tackle gets just enough of the cornerback on a cut block to give the wide receiver a clear lane to the inside.

Next, we see the ball being caught. The left tackle cuts the cornerback, giving the receiver a clear running lane. Four more offensive linemen head downfield to block – on only one defensive back.

More blockers than defenders = something good is going to happen

More blockers than defenders = something good is going to happen.

From there, there is nothing but open space ahead.

Highway to the end zone

Highway to the end zone.

The true value of the play goes beyond the 6 points that go up on the board. The defense must always be wary of the throwback (coach John Jenkins was known to run it repeatedly in the same game, using it as a staple play). This opens up the field for the basic offense to the sprint side – which is what Houston wanted to be running, anyways.  It also slows down the rush, by penalizing a defense who pressures the quarterback with too much abandon.  This, in turn, gave the Houston quarterbacks more time to throw.

The throwback screen is difficult to execute and requires extensive practice commitment.  The offensive line must be athletic and have great timing, the quarterback must be accurate enough and with a strong enough arm to spin under pressure and hit the receiver in the chest with the ball, the receiver must be fearless enough to take a hit if the defense isn’t fooled and fast enough to exploit them if they are, and the coach must be dedicated enough to install the play with patience.  If those elements are present, the throwback screen is a valuable investment for any team who uses sprint action extensively or who faces over-aggressive opponents.

The link to the play (at 9:00) as well as great end zone footage of the Houston run and shoot against Texas:

Below, Tony Franklin and Sonny Dykes show us a modern version of the play with the 2013 California Golden Bears:

May 272014
 

Perhaps the most explosive running play in the modern era of football is the veer triple option. From the time that Bill Yeoman’s Houston Cougars broke records with the play in the 1960s until the present day – peaking with the 49ers scoring 3 touchdowns in the 2012 NFC championship while using a variation of the scheme – it continues to rack up yards.

But related concepts appeared even before Yeoman’s day. Don Faurot may, in fact, have been the originator of the triple option, using it to power his Split-T Missouri backfield to great success in the 1940s. The video below displays the basic concepts that would power all future veer schemes: not blocking certain defenders in order to gain more blocking downfield and to give the offense a 3 on 2 or 2 on 1 advantage, similar to the fast breaks in basketball that influenced Faurot’s innovation. The footage – slowed due to the cameras of the time – shows the unblocked defenders steaming into the backfield while the dive back rushes ahead or the quarterback pitches behind (and notice the underhanded “pitch”).

Faurot coached the Iowa Pre-Flight Seahawks during the World War II years, where he had an assistant coach named Bud Wilkinson. Wilkinson took the Split-T (and it’s signature option) with him to Oklahoma. There, the offense powered the Sooners to a 47-game winning streak from 1953 to 1957, an NCAA Division I record that still stands today.

The following video shows the 1955 Oklahoma Sooners season highlights:

Bill Yeoman invented the veer offense at Houston in 1964. His offense went on to lead the nation in offense for three straight years, and led the country in scoring in 1968. For anyone looking to implement the veer, the 1968 playbook remains a masterpiece. There is no better source for understanding the offense:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/2939669/1968-Houston-Veer

The veer scheme eventually powered the wishbone offense. The final wishbone powerhouse were the Oklahoma Sooners and Barry Switzer, who used it to win 3 national championships and 12 Big Eight titles. They also set the all time single game rushing record of 768 yards, as seen here:

The flexbone later grew out of the wishbone. The most notable current flexbone coach is Paul Johnson. This blog post details Johnson’s “If then” play calling methodology. This methodology is not only valuable to coaches looking to run veer based option offenses, but to any coaches who are looking for a methodology to systematically call their plays in order to exploit weaknesses in a defense.

http://footballislifeblog.blogspot.dk/2011/07/paul-johnsons-if-then-methodology-to.html

Perhaps the most famous current split back veer team is the De La Salle Spartans, known for their record 151 game winning streak. The highlights below show the birth of that win streak and display the speed and downfield blocking that continue to exemplify the Spartans.

In the following link, the architect of that team – Bob Ladouceur – details the ideals that formed the Spartans juggernaut. The article is not veer specific (though it does discuss the offense in some detail), but is essential team building material.

http://fastandfuriousfootball.com/wp-content/uploads/coachingmaterial2/De%20La%20Salle%20High%20Motivation.pdf

Finally, the most modern variation may only be a distant relative of the split back veer, but still incorporates the dive back, and the unblocked defender as the first man on or outside the tackle. Here, Colin Kaepernick uses the veer scheme several times during his record 181 yard rushing game against the Green Bay Packers.

May 172014
 

“Read option” is one of the most overused terms in football. From commentators to sideline reporters to sportswriters, a myriad of plays are lumped together and mislabeled “read option.”

In reality, every option is a “read” option. The quarterback always reads an unblocked defender or defenders to determine whether to give the ball, keep it, or pitch it.

Still, the “read option” has become synonymous with shotgun, spread option football. The play that epitomized the spread option running game is what most coaches call the “zone read.” The key feature of this play is that the offensive line zone blocks for a run to the right or left, while the quarterback reads a defender to the backside. If that defender over pursues the zone handoff to the running back, the quarterback keeps the ball to the space that he vacated.

5 Eagles offensive linemen for 5 Giants defenders; the 6th defender (in the yellow box) becomes the option key.

5 Eagles offensive linemen for 5 Giants defenders; the 6th defender (in the yellow box) becomes the option key.

In short, in the zone read, the quarterback and running back are going in opposite directions from one another.

The quarterback and running back aim in opposite directions

The quarterback and running back aim in opposite directions

The zone read – for whatever reason – became known as the “read option.” This was a fine development, until it began to be applied to every option play from the shotgun or pistol formation.

The option key tackles the running back, so the quarterback keeps to the vacated space

The option key tackles the running back, so the quarterback keeps to the vacated space

The option key tackles the running back; the quarterback has correctly kept the ball.

The option key tackles the running back; the quarterback has correctly kept the ball.

Easy yards for the quarterback

Easy yards for the quarterback on the zone read (“read option”)

The most glaring example of this phenomenon was during the “read option” explosion in the NFL in 2012, when both the 49ers and Redskins had great success with the “read option” from the Pistol formation. The only problem is that the vast majority of their success was not from the “read option,” but from the veer scheme.

In the veer scheme, the option/dive key is the first man on or outside the offensive tackle

In the veer scheme, the option/dive key is the first man on or outside the offensive tackle

The key difference between the veer and the zone read is that in the veer scheme, the dive back and the quarterback are both attacking the same side of the field. In the traditional veer scheme, the offensive line does not block the first man on or outside the play side tackle. This becomes the option key. The dive back aims – at full speed – between the guard and the tackle. If the option key can’t make the tackle, the quarterback hands off, and the running back runs underneath the option key, following extra blocks on the second level and third level (because the tackle and tight end – if there is one – do not block anyone on the line of scrimmage, which frees them to block downfield). If the option key can tackle the dive back, he can’t tackle the quarterback. The quarterback keeps the ball, and follows the same extra downfield blocking (note that in a true veer triple option – which the 49ers and Redskins rarely ran – the quarterback would have a second option key and the option to pitch to a pitch back depending on that option key’s movements).

 

The quarterback and running back attack the same side of the field in the veer scheme.  Here, the option key is too far up the field, so the ball is given to the dive back

The quarterback and running back attack the same side of the field in the veer scheme. Here, the option key is too far up the field, so the ball is given to the dive back

Thus, in the “read option” the quarterback and the running back go in opposite directions, while in the veer scheme they attack the same side of the field and follow the same blocking.

 

The offensive line walls off the middle of the field, and the dive back follows behind, while the option key cannot recover

The offensive line walls off the middle of the field, and the dive back follows behind, while the option key cannot recover

The dive back glides along the veer wall to the end zone

The dive back glides along the veer wall to the end zone

Less common in the NFL, but still mislabeled, is the midline option. The play is similar to the veer scheme, except that the option key is the first man on or outside the play side guard, and the dive back’s path is over center or just to the play side (depending on the coach). Again, this varies from the “read option” in that the dive back and the quarterback both run to the same side of the field.

Apr 132014
 

Prior to 2013, critics doubted whether Chip Kelly could succeed in the NFL.  Many tagged him with the dreaded “college coach” label.  Kelly – along with Jim Harbaugh and Pete Carroll – are quickly turning that label into a positive.  Harbaugh has done so with his power schemes and manic enthusiasm, Carroll with his passion and smothering defense.  Chip Kelly has done so with an emphasis on simplicity and execution, two qualities that are often overlooked in what has largely become a complex, matchup based league.

Kelly’s devotion to the hurry up no huddle is well known, with the extra repetitions gained in practice and games combining with a comparably simple playbook to improve execution.  His offense is no gimmick – it is based on sound football principles.  At his core, Kelly wants to run the ball.  The basis of this running game are his zone concepts.

Kelly teaches a counting system to his offensive line on zone running plays.  This simplifies their reads, as the line merely needs to count the defense in the box and block it accordingly.  The center identifies 0, the first in-box defender to the playside.  The playside guard blocks number 1 (the next defender to the playside), and the tackle blocks number 2.  The backside guard blocks number 1 backside, and the backside tackle blocks number 2 backside.  A tight end or extra blocker would block number 3.  Kelly’s famous “read option” (as it has become known) assigns the quarterback to “block” any extra backside defender with his eyes, if there is one.  If that player is aggressive on the handoff, the quarterback keeps the ball to the space he vacated.  If that player is not aggressive on the handoff, the quarterback has successfully “blocked” him from tackling the ball carrier.  If no such “extra” defender is in the box, the quarterback hands the ball off every time.  Thus, what has become known as a “read option” is nothing more than a zone run that gives the quarterback the ability to keep the ball if the defense brings more defenders than the offensive line can block.

The simplicity and execution of this counting system can be seen in LeSean McCoy’s 2013 week 1 touchdown against the Washington Redskins.

Before the snap, we see the Eagles in an unbalanced formation, with three offensive linemen to their left.  The play will be run to their right.  As one can see below, their counting system allows them to adjust to the defensive front with ease  – a necessity in the NFL, where defenses are ever changing and complex.  Note that the stacked defensive lineman and linebacker to the playside are both considered player 1 and player 2, necessitating a combo block from the right guard and right tackle (who in this case is a tight end).  This complex blocking takes time and communication to master, another reason why the simplicity of Kelly’s offense is a benefit to their team.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 1

As the play unfolds, we can see the linemen taking great angles to “cover up” their men.  This is a hallmark of zone blocking – it is more important to get a body on a defensive player and wash him towards the direction he wants to go than it is to attempt to blow them up off the ball.  We can also see Michael Vick “blocking” the extra defender in the box (#4). Additionally, McCoy’s momentum begins parallel to the line of scrimmage, towards the sideline, influencing Redskins defenders to fight towards the outside.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 2

McCoy has the ball now, and has made his hard cut down the field.  We can see that some of the Redskins are still moving towards the sideline, as their momentum – and the Eagles blockers – are taking them there.  The hole is large for McCoy, and not because any of his linemen have made a devastating knockout block.  None of the linemen have driven a Redskins player off the ball.  But they have put bodies on bodies, allowing a back with great vision and talent such as McCoy to find and exploit the opening seam of the defense.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 3

This allows McCoy to get into the open field with a head of steam.  He is among the hardest runners in the NFL to tackle when given such space.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 4

Kelly’s offense has always thrived on letting his athletes perform in space.  Here we get an example: McCoy hurdling a defender as he winds back towards the opposite sideline.

 Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 5

And we see the final element of what makes Kelly’s offense tick: downfield blocking by receivers.  As in all “big play” running offenses, Kelly depends on his receivers to help turn long runs into touchdown runs.  Here we get a great example of McCoy reading Riley Cooper’s butt to cut inside, aided by the terrific cut block by Jason Avant to form a clear running lane.

Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 6

McCoy gives Eagles fans an example of what Oregon fans grew to know well – a runner in the clear with enough space to celebrate before reaching the end zone.

Chip Kelly Simplicity and Execution 7

Chip Kelly has done a tremendous job of creating a system that can take advantage of the talent he has on his teams.  The beauty of the system is that it is based on sound football principles.  Though it has been labeled a “space age” offense, perhaps the biggest innovation of the system is the return of simplicity to the NFL.   This simplicity also means that his system is duplicable at all levels of play.  Even if one doesn’t want to run the hurry up or the spread, teaching such a counting system to the offensive line is an easy way to improve their communication.  No matter how complex the defensive front is, it can always be boiled down to a simple count.  Much like Kelly’s offense, the beauty lies in the simplicity.

Mar 292014
 

The wham block is an underutilized weapon that will turn the aggressiveness of a dominant defensive lineman against him.

Related to the trap, the wham block sends a skill player to block a defensive lineman from an angle with an element of surprise.  Often utilizing motion, the wham discourages penetration by sending the message that the defensive lineman can never know when he will be blindsided along the line of scrimmage.

Wham 1

Diagram 1 (above) shows the blocking scheme for the play.  Delanie Walker is sent in short motion, giving him increased momentum to blast Ndamukong Suh.  Notice how the scheme, combined with trap and fold blocks across the line, allows 49ers offensive linemen to block down the field.  This downfield blocking is a hallmark of big plays in the run game.  The scheme turns the Lions aggressiveness against itself, wasting the defensive linemen who were quick to penetrate up the field.

Wham 2

Diagram 2 (above): The moment of impact.

Wham 3

Diagram 3 (above): The meeting of scheme and execution.  The 49ers scheme has worked to perfection – two defensive linemen (including Suh, the disruptive force who necessitates the scheme) are already behind the play, wasted to the defensive.  Four 49er offensive linemen are down the field to make blocks.

Also note Vernon Davis.  As the play unfolds, he blocks his man across the field.  In diagram 1, we see the defensive end lined up on Davis’s inside shade.  In diagram 2, Davis has locked him to the inside.  In diagram 3, Davis has begun to drive him across the formation.  In diagram 4, Davis has driven him off the screen.

Davis’s block as well as the 49ers offensive line’s ability to block downfield reminds us that no matter what the scheme, the most important predictor of success is the execution of fundamentals. 

Wham 4

Discouraging aggressiveness encourages passivity, which helps to control a dominant defensive line or a particular defensive lineman.  The wham – despite having faded in popularity – is a valuable tool in achieving that end.  It is one of the power elements that Jim Harbaugh has brought to the table in turning also-rans at the University of San Diego, Stanford, and the 49ers into contenders.