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Jul 132015
 

I’ve recently been in conversations with californiagoldenblogs.com, and will now be writing posts for them in addition to totalamericanfootball.com. This means that totalamericanfootball.com will become somewhat Cal centric. It does not mean that there will only be posts about Cal.

Aside from being my favorite college team, Cal is also an exciting team to watch from a coaching perspective; Tony Franklin has long at the forefront of the offensive game (his “Tony Franklin System” is used by high schools across the U.S.), and Sonny Dykes is on the path towards a successful (and complete) program makeover/rebuild.

My latest post is up now, and details how talent + execution = probability of success in the context of a key third down conversion for Cal. Check it out here.

“…Colorado, however, does not stay in a two high safety shell.  They tip their hand just before the snap.  One of two high safeties creeps towards the line of scrimmage, while the other walks towards the center of the formation.  They have disguised the coverage for most of the pre snap period, but now their options are more limited.  Realistically, in this one high shell, only one defender will defend the out route by Stephen Anderson: the outside linebacker/nickelback who is aligned just to the inside of Anderson.  This is because Colorado must account for a vertical route by the #1 receiver (the widest receiver); the safety has too far to run from the middle of the field to cover this route by himself (or to help with an out route by #2), thus meaning that the cornerback must cover a vertical route by #1, therefore leaving only one man who can possibly defend an out route by #2: the inside linebacker/nickelback…”

Nov 082014
 

Many coaches and fans believe that a man pass coverage scheme leads to better run defense. This is because – the thinking goes – primary run defenders are given more freedom to attack the run with aggressiveness, while primary pass defenders focus on covering receivers. If the defensive coordinator is willing to play with limited help over the top, it also allows the defense to load the box to stop the run. For example, in a common “man free” scheme against a traditional two wide receiver set, the two cornerbacks lock up the wide receivers and the safety plays over the top, while the remaining 8 defenders can play close to the line to stop the run.

Such thinking has extended to defend spread offenses. Against a “spread to run” opponent, one strategy is to lock in man coverage on the receivers to take away quick patterns, while giving your team a numerical advantage inside the box. Because of this numbers advantage, the defense can be aggressive with run fits, blitzes, and stunts. The numbers advantage can often be achieved even while keeping two safeties on the field, because of pattern matching principles, which allow outside linebackers to stay closer to the box and safeties to play the run more aggressively (further explained below).

Man coverage principles can, however, weaken a run defense.

The primary reason is because it is very difficult for a defender to play man coverage and maintain proper run discipline and pursuit. With responsibility focused on a receiver, a defender is much more likely to be run out of a play by a receiver simulating a pass pattern. Edge defenders will have difficulty preventing the ball from being run outside when they also have to defend routes that take them inside. The offense can also more easily manipulate defensive alignment in order to break contain. For example, a trips formation to one side with a tight end on the other side may lead to only a linebacker standing between the offense and the sideline on the tight end side of the field. If the offense can break that contain (against a linebacker instead of a defensive back), they have a big play on their hands.

Enter California and their prolific offensive coordinator, Tony Franklin, against the Oregon State Beavers. Oregon State under Mike Riley is and continues to be one of the most sound and well coached programs in the country, consistently fielding rugged, overachieving teams. They came into the game with a strong pass defense that seemed to match up well against Cal’s powerful air attack. In this game, however, their man principles hurt their ability to stop Cal’s running game.

As one can see below, Oregon State lines up in a two safety shell against Cal’s four wide receiver (2×2) offensive set. The outside linebackers split the distance between the #2 receivers (the 2nd receiver from the outside) and the offensive tackles. The safeties play inside shade of the #2 receivers, while the cornerbacks line up in press coverage on the wide receivers.

What is not clear is whether the Beavers are playing true man coverage, or pattern matching principles. Pattern matching is a method by which particular defenders lock in man coverage against certain offensive patterns, while playing zone against others. For example, a typical pattern matching scheme is for the outside linebackers to cover any short out route by a #2 receiver in man coverage, while they would re-route any vertical stem by the #2 receiver, and then look to help in the flat. The safety would cover any vertical route (more than 7-10 yards) by #2, while the CB would cover any vertical route by #1. In many ways, pattern matching combines the best of both zone and man coverage – nobody has to cover every pattern, so they can be more aggressive against the run, while maintaining the benefits of man coverage against the pass. Teams such as Michigan State (which bases out of a 2 safety, cover 4 pattern matching defense) and the Seattle Seahawks (a primary 1 high safety [Earl Thomas, perhaps the best safety in the game], cover 3 defense) have built dominating defenses on such principles (see https://www.totalamericanfootball.com/improving-cornerback-play-with-cover-3-and-cover-4-press-the-rise-of-richard-sherman-darqueze-dennard-the-seattle-seahawks-and-the-michigan-state-spartans/ for an in depth explanation of how such principles aid cornerback play). Michigan State’s defense has – in particular – taken the coaching world by storm. Simply put, the Spartans have laid out a blueprint that allows safeties and linebackers to play the run aggressively (thus effectively creating a 9 man box) while having less fear of being burned in the passing game, because they do not have to cover every pattern by a particular receiver. The Spartans defenders are terrific at reading run or pass and reacting accordingly. Unfortunately for the Beavers, even if they were using such a pattern matching scheme (it is unclear if they were), they were much too quick to jump into man principles on any particular play against Cal.  Franklin exploited this over-zealousness on many occasions, both on run/pass neutral downs and on obvious passing downs.

Whether or not the Beavers were playing man or a pattern matching zone on this play, their defenders locked in on receivers in man coverage as soon as those receivers ran their routes. When Cal ran the ball, Oregon State was left with little support.

Oregon State is lined up in a typical 2 safety shell, with safeties on the inside shade of the #2 receivers, OLBs splitting the distance between #2 and the offensive tackle, and the cornerbacks in press coverage.  With the outside linebackers so close to the box, Oregon State would appear to have a numbers advantage against the run.  Their front seven remains close to the ball (though both OLBs are slightly outside the box), while Cal only has 5 offensive linemen to block the interior, with no lead backs or tight ends to help counterbalance the Oregon State front.

Oregon State is lined up in a 2 safety shell, with safeties on the inside shade of the #2 receivers, outside linebackers splitting the distance between #2 and the offensive tackle, and the cornerbacks in press coverage. With the outside linebackers so close to the box, Oregon State would appear to have a numbers advantage against the run. Their front seven remains close to the ball (though both outside linebackers are slightly outside the box), while Cal only has 5 offensive linemen to block the interior, with no lead backs or tight ends to help counterbalance the Oregon State front.

Cal quarterback Jared Goff turns and immediately hands to running back Daniel Lasco.  There is no pass fake from the backfield action (though Goff does fake setting up for a pass after he hands the ball to Lasco).

Cal quarterback Jared Goff turns and immediately hands to running back Daniel Lasco. There is no initial pass fake from the backfield action (though Goff does fake setting up for a pass after he hands the ball to Lasco).

After the ball is handed off, we see that the Beavers have already lost both CBs.  Both have their backs turned, defending pass patterns.  Even worse, their playside outside linebacker has turned his back to the ball, and is covering a slot receiver on a quick out route.  Both safeties are eyeing the slot receivers.

After the ball is handed off, we see that the Beavers have already lost both cornerbacks. Both have their backs turned, defending pass patterns. Even worse, their playside outside linebacker has turned his back to the ball, and is covering a slot receiver on a quick out route. Both safeties are eying the slot receivers.

As Lasco reaches the line of scrimmage, the Beavers have lost their advantage.  The playside outside linebacker is almost beyond the hash marks, still chasing the quick out route.  The playside safety IS outside the hash marks, most likely looking to help with the vertical route being run by receiver #1 to his side.  Both cornerbacks are completely removed from the play, as is the weakside safety, who is also likely to be helping with the vertical route by his #1.

As Lasco reaches the line of scrimmage, the Beavers have lost their advantage. The playside outside linebacker is almost beyond the hash marks, still chasing the quick out route. The playside safety IS outside the hash marks, most likely looking to help with the vertical route being run by receiver #1 to his side. Both cornerbacks are completely removed from the play, as is the weakside safety, who is also likely to be helping with the vertical route by his #1.

Notice that the Cal offensive line hasn't manhandled anybody - they simply put bodies on bodies.  The Oregon State middle linebacker has filled his gap decently well - but there is no help from the playside linebacker or safety to squeeze the play, and Lasco easily scoots outside.  No support means that nothing is squeezed to the middle of the field, effectively rendering meaningless any pursuit from the Oregon State front.

Notice that the Cal offensive line hasn’t manhandled anybody – they simply put bodies on bodies. The Oregon State middle linebacker has filled his gap decently well – but there is no help from the playside outside linebacker or safety to squeeze the play, and Lasco easily scoots outside. No support means that nothing is squeezed to the middle of the field, effectively rendering meaningless any pursuit from the Oregon State front.

Lasco heads towards the secondary.  The playside safety has now reacted, but - as with his middle linebacker - he has no help from his opposite safety, allowing Lasco to veer easily away from his pursuit.

Lasco heads towards the secondary. The playside safety has now reacted, but – as with his middle linebacker – he has no help from his opposite safety, allowing Lasco to veer easily away from his pursuit.

As Lasco cruises into the end zone, neither the backside safety nor the backside cornerback has come into view - both have been occupied by the #1 receiver.

As Lasco cruises into the end zone, neither the backside safety nor the backside cornerback has come into view – both have been occupied by the #1 receiver.

Every defense has its weakness. This post is not meant to say that man coverage and man principles cannot produce great defensive football. The aim of the post is to point out a (perhaps) hidden weakness in man coverage that many fans and coaches do not consider.

See the video here:

http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=espn:11807066

Oct 082014
 

Not long ago, balanced, professional style offensive systems ruled college football. Just 10 years ago, the final 2004 AP Poll read like a randomly assembled list of traditional college football powers: USC, Oklahoma, Georgia, LSU, Florida State, Miami, Texas, Michigan, Ohio State, and West Virginia. True, Texas ran a version of the spread offense, but to take advantage of one of the great talents in college football history (Vince Young), not because the coaching staff had a history rooted in a non-traditional offense. The only team running a true “system” offense was – not surprisingly – the only non-traditional power of the bunch: Rich Rodriguez’s spread option West Virginia Mountaineers.

Fast forward to October 4th, 2014. For the first time in the history of the AP Poll, five of the top eight teams lose in the same weekend. Oregon, which became a power on the strength of Chip Kelly’s hurry up spread option system, is cut down by the Arizona Wildcats, with – you guessed it – Rich Rodriquez at the helm. Juggernaut Alabama and their pro style offense are chopped down by traditional also-ran Mississippi and their version of the packaged hurry up spread. Mississippi State – another SEC second thought – dominates Texas A&M. UCLA is edged by former mid-major Utah. TCU – who from 1996-2011 bounced between the Western Athletic Conference, Conference USA, and the Mountain West Conference – takes out Oklahoma.

Come Sunday, half of the top 10 was made up of non-traditional powers: Mississippi State, Mississippi, Baylor, TCU, and Arizona.

“System” offenses have a set ideology and method for attacking a defense. It does not mean that they are unbalanced in terms of run/pass ratio (as many people assume), but it does mean that they have a strong identity of plays and formations and a consistent methodology for attacking a defense. The wing t did it with multiple series and an order of playcalling designed to put defenders in conflict. The split t, split back veer, wishbone, and flexbone did it by building around the triple option and taking advantage of defenses designed to stop that play. The run and shoot did it with after the snap option routes designed to defeat any defensive look. The list goes on…

The key to the hurry up spread – the current system du jour – is that any, and almost every, previous system can be adapted to the spread. Many teams couple the spread with the Air Raid, itself a simplified adaptation of the old LaVell Edwards BYU passing offense. Rodriquez, Kelly, and many others base their offense on zone running and option concepts. Auburn’s Gus Malzahn has coupled it with the wing t. Cal’s offensive coordinator Tony Franklin has roots in the Air Raid, but now seeks run/pass balance with a variety of creative runs passes, and packaged concepts.

The beauty of the variety of spread offenses is that most of these offenses do not require a roster loaded with 5 and 4 star recruits in order to succeed. Instead, a good personnel “fits” for the offense are of the utmost importance. An offense can be designed in order to take advantage of lower tier recruits who are hand picked to fill the roles that will make that offense successful. And – because the offenses are adaptable – they can highlight the strengths and hide the weaknesses of a roster that is built with lower tier recruits.

When pro style offenses ruled the day, the traditional powers dominated the recruitment of prototypical players to fit those offenses. With superior talent, the pro style quarterback could hand off to the prototypical running back or throw a play action pass to the future NFL tight end or wide receivers behind an offensive line made up of prototypical maulers.

Rich Rodriguez, with future NFL return man Rasheed Marshall at quarterback, helped changed the status quo. Now, if you couldn’t recruit the towering pocket passer with the rocket arm, you look to recruit the spindly speedster. If you didn’t have any luck finding the 6’3” wide receivers or the pro style tight ends, you put an under recruited, undersized athlete in the slot (Wes Welker at Texas Tech being perhaps the most famous example), and play without a tight end. Can’t find the future NFL road graders in the line? That’s okay – recruit speed and technique, and make it work in your system.

In short, the rise of the “system” offenses in college football has led to more coaches being able to better utilize the talent of more athletes, which has evened the playing field with the traditional elite programs. This evened playing field will continue to lead to more parity, more upsets, and a more exciting product. And it isn’t just the spread offenses that are making waves. Georgia Tech, with their flexbone triple option, which traces roots back to the Don Faurot split t of the early 1940s, lurks undefeated at the bottom of the top 25…

Aug 062014
 

Play calling is not only one of the most difficult tasks in coaching, but also what coaches are most often criticized for. While it may seem easy to those watching at home, the multiple stresses present when calling a game in the heat of the moment make it easy for a coach to make decisions that he will question in hindsight.

The best way to increase the likelihood of calling a good game is – obviously – to have a plan.

The most publicized methods for play calling come from the college and pro ranks. Television cameras usually show a head coach or offensive coordinator with a large, laminated printout, with hundreds of plays on front and back, highlighted and sorted for every situation that the coach can foresee. There is often a script, which is a set list of plays to start the game. And then there are lists of plays for first and 10, second and 10, third and ten, second and medium, second and short, third and medium, third and short, third and long, goal line, two minute, trick plays, etc etc etc.

This is a sound approach. It allows a coach to quickly access plays that he has pre-selected for certain situations. By pre-selecting the plays, he has already thought through what he thinks will work. He will not be frazzled when he faces a 4th and 15 with the game on the line – he has selected the best plays for that situation when he had a clear head, before the game.

But there are other methods that can be just as – if not more – successful. One such method is “if/then playcalling.” In short, if/then playcalling says: “if the defense does this, then we will do this.” This is a great way for a coach to organize his thoughts, as it gives him a set response to whatever adjustments the defense makes.

This is most effective when running a true “system” offense. One of the best articles on the subject details flexbone master Paul Johnson’s if/then methodology: http://footballislifeblog.blogspot.dk/2011/07/paul-johnsons-if-then-methodology-to.html

When running a “system” such as the flexbone, it is often hard to prepare to face a particular defense, because opponents will often create a special defense specifically to face that system, unrelated to their base defense. Determining your if/then methodology makes sure that you will have an answer for whatever the defense throws at you.

This is also beneficial in playbook creation. If, for example, you are a triple option team, but you have no response for heavy blitzing and stunting in the middle of your line that disrupts your timing and mesh points, the defense will seize on that weakness. By creating an if/then methodology for yourself, you force yourself to think like a defensive coach to come up with every possible scheme to stop your offense. Then you must make sure that you have a response for all scenarios. Doing so – much like studying for an exam by taking practice tests – creates an active learning environment, which will lead to greater understanding and mastery of one’s own offensive system.

The if/then methodology and similar methods of planning work in a variety of offensive systems. The if/then methodology is closely related to the “Wing T order of football,” (The Delaware Wing-T: An Order of Football
) in which a Wing T master knows exactly how to place various defenders in conflict, and how to take advantage of whatever actions the defense takes. Likewise, Mike Leach of Air Raid fame is known for keeping his plays on a small sheet of paper, and using a pen to mark what plays work and what plays don’t work. His goal is to take what the defense gives him – and make note of it – which is another variation of an if/then methodology.

System football – and offensive football in general – is all about taking advantage of the structural weaknesses in a defense. Incorporating an if/then methodology into your play calling will force you to consider how you believe you can best dissect a defense, which is the core of any “system” offense. Even if you find that if/then play calling is not for you during the game, thinking in terms of how to respond (and making sure you have a response) to any defense will help any offense.

Apr 292014
 

In part one, we discussed the advantages of playing with a cheap quarterback, and asked whether an NFL team would ever consider implementing a system designed to minimize reliance on a traditional “pro style” quarterback.  This would allow such a team to refuse to pay a quarterback over a certain cap figure, therefore gaining an advantage in their ability to strengthen the remainder of their roster under the salary cap.

Please note that this isn’t to say that paying a franchise NFL quarterback is a bad idea.  If the quarterback is a star, it is of course smart to pay that quarterback, and players like Peyton Manning, Tom Brady, Drew Brees, and Aaron Rodgers have proven their ability to put their team on their shoulders as consistent championship contenders.  This article is a hypothetical for those teams who never seem to stumble upon the star quarterback, and who therefore remain stagnant in mediocrity year after year.

The rarest commodity in football is the great drop back pocket quarterback.  It has proven nearly impossible to predict which quarterbacks will succeed in the NFL, because so many of the skills are intangible and hard to measure against college competition.  That is why the list of number one overall picks includes the likes of JaMarcus Russell, David Carr, and Tim Couch.  The list of top NFL quarterbacks currently in the league is a mix of number one overall picks like Peyton Manning and Andrew Luck with overlooked prospects like Tom Brady (a “fringe” NFL prospect selected in the 6th round), Aaron Rodgers (too slight and with too much attitude to be taken with the first pick) and Drew Brees (too short to be a first round prospect).

The specific quarterback skills that have proven almost impossible to predict are: the ability to make complex progression reads against complex, fast NFL defenses; the ability to deliver the ball from the pocket against pressure from an NFL pass rush; and the ability to deliver the ball with accuracy and proper timing despite the above mentioned factors.  While arm strength and accuracy (now referred to as “arm talent”), leadership, intelligence, and positive demeanor all play a role in predicting the success of a pro style quarterback, none of them have been able to predict whether the player would possess or have the ability to develop the intangible skills that make a successful pro style quarterback.  Plenty of smart, hard working, positive leaders with great arms have failed in the NFL because those skills are so rare and hard to develop.

An “interchangeable quarterback offense” would seek to minimize the reliance on such skills, and would emphasize easier to predict qualities, such as arm talent, running ability, leadership and intelligence.

The following offensive systems and coaches are candidates to run such a system.  Please note that inclusion on the list does not mean that a quarterback who plays in such an offense is not or cannot become a good pro style quarterback in a traditional offense.  It is only to say that the offense does not require a traditional pro style quarterback to be successful.

(1) Chip Kelly.  Kelly has already proved this possible in the NFL, shifting between Michael Vick and Nick Foles with great success.  His offense spreads the field to create easy pre snap reads for the quarterback and offensive line.  The offense is built on the run game, as the spread formation forces the defense to defend the width of the field, making it easier for the offensive line to count and block the box (see here).  It can accommodate fast quarterbacks like Vick who can take advantage of over pursuit against the zone run game by keeping the ball (the “read option”), or it can accommodate more stationary quarterbacks like Foles by creating easy reads, quick throws, and taking advantage of packaged plays in order to hold backside defenders.  Kelly’s tempo allows the quarterback to get into a rhythm without over thinking the offense, while also limiting the defense’s ability to call complex schemes.  Because the offense is built on the run game, a top offensive line and above average running backs are a necessity, while favorable coverages mean that the offense can succeed without premier pass catchers (Kelly’s confidence in the latter is evident in the Eagles’ release of DeSean Jackson).  Money can be spent on the offensive line and defense.

(2) Gus Malzahn.  Malzahn is perhaps the most intriguing coach on the list.  His offense is also a hurry up spread offense, but is schematically dissimilar to Kelly’s attack.  Malzahn’s offense is based on the Delaware wing t, one of the most potent running offenses in the history of football.  Unlike Kelly’s zone scheme, the wing t takes advantage of angle blocks and a variety of pulls and traps.  The offense is built on an order of play calling to systematically attack any defense.  The up tempo pace simplifies this process (especially with a master such as Malzahn at the helm), as the defense’s ability to substitute and vary schemes is limited. This order of attack of the traditional wing t is combined with elements of modern spread option and spread passing games to create a potent attack that takes advantage of a great athlete at quarterback.  Like Kelly’s offense, the potency of the run game and the spread formations create easy reads and progressions in the pass game, making the offense ideal to plug and play non traditional quarterbacks.  This is why Malzahn has thrived with a variety of athletes at quarterback, from prototypically built #1 overall pick Cam Newton, to the smaller, quicker Nick Marshall, who began his career as a cornerback at Georgia, to less physically imposing Paul Smith at Tulsa, who threw for over 5,000 yards in his season with Malzahn, proving the versatility of the system.  In fact, Malzahn had a streak of needing to find a new starting quarterback for 8 straight seasons (see here), his system flexible enough to adjust year in and year out.  Should he choose to move to the NFL, Malzahn would have his pick of under the radar quarterbacks to run his potent system.

(3) The pistol offense.  The pistol offense makes a quarterback’s job easier in several ways.  The run game is powerful and downhill.  The veer scheme requires a quarterback with top flight speed (such as Robert Griffin III and Colin Kaepernick) because the mesh point happens deeper in the backfield, but with that speed, the defense is forced to decide between playing aggressive against the option elements (potentially leading to over aggressiveness that the veer scheme can exploit, and easy reads for the quarterback in the pass game) or playing a more passive defense that is susceptible to the power elements of the scheme.  The pistol also takes the quarterback out from under center, giving him increased vision in the pass game.  The offense has already thrived with the Redskins and 49ers, though neither has used it exclusively.  While Chris Ault is retired and unlikely to get an NFL look, the offense is popular enough for other coaches to implement the scheme.  The most likely scenario is for it to continue to be used within “typical” NFL offenses, as a weapon to take advantage of a quarterback with the speed of Griffin III or Kaepernick.

(4) Jim Harbaugh power offense.  Jim Harbaugh makes the list because he is confident enough in his system and his ability as a quarterbacks coach to believe he can make a wide range of quarterbacks successful.  He has already proven adept, resurrecting Alex Smith’s career, and turning raw Colin Kaepernick into one of the league’s premier playmakers.  His system is built on a powerful and complex run game, unbalanced lines, pre snap shifts, and versatile personnel.  Defensive coordinators know that Harbaugh is looking to assert his will with his complex run game.  The potent run and play action games in turn create easier reads for the quarterbacks.  Unlike the spread and many NFL offenses, Harbaugh often keeps extra blockers in the backfield, giving his quarterback simpler 4 or 3 or even 2 receiver reads.

Harbaugh’s offense is complex, however, requiring quarterbacks to choose between multiple plays at the line of scrimmage on most snaps depending on the defense.  But those decisions are a matter of intelligence, not instinct, and intelligence is more easily measured than intangible NFL quarterback skills.  This is why Harbaugh has been successful with Alex Smith and Colin Kaepernick, both of whom have size, speed, arm strength and intelligence, but whose NFL drop back quarterback skills were questioned before Harbaugh became their coach.

Harbaugh and the 49ers will soon show their intentions.  Should they pay Colin Kaepernick like a top NFL quarterback, they take the course of the typical NFL franchise.  Should they attempt to low ball Kaepernick in negotiations, it will be a sign of their confidence in Harbaugh’s quarterback development abilities.  Don’t be surprised if the 49ers pick another raw, athletic, developmental quarterback with great arm strength in the upcoming draft, such as Virginia Tech’s Logan Thomas.

(5) The Air Raid crew.  The coaching tree that Hal Mumme started (including Mike Leach, Kevin Sumlin, Art Broyles, Dana Holgorsen, and Tony Franklin)  continues to tear up the college ranks.  Rooted in LaVell Edwards’s BYU passing offense, hallmarks of the Air Raid are simplicity, tempo, and a willingness to throw the ball all of the time (in the original Air Raid offense).  These factors – like Kelly’s and Malzahn’s offenses – simplify quarterback reads.  Unlike Kelly’s and Malzahns, the Air Raid offense centers on the passing game.  The core Air Raid coaches (Mumme, Leach) seek to throw the ball to the extreme, therefore perfecting their limited plays and creating some of the most potent offenses in NFL history. The simple reads, small playbook, and insistence on throwing help a quarterback get into a rhythm, which is one reason why Leach was able to plug in one record setting, below the radar recruit after another at Texas Tech and now Washington State.

The two most likely NFL coaches – Sumlin and Broyles – seek more balance in the offense.  Both have produced major NFL prospects in the last several years (Johnny Manziel for Sumlin and Griffin III for Broyles).  More importantly, both have been just as successful with quarterbacks who were seen as having little NFL potential.  They are masters of the spread passing game, and with so many quarterbacks throwing from the spread in youth football, high school, and college, it only makes sense that an experienced spread coach would ease the transition to the NFL for such quarterbacks.

(6) Run and shoot.  The run and shoot makes the list because it has already thrived in the NFL.  The offense is designed as “organized playground ball,” allowing receivers to find open space after the snap depending on the defense.  While the offense is difficult to master, it has thrived in the NFL and USFL with a variety of quarterbacks.  The reads required are different from the complex NFL progressions that make the position so difficult, and as the name implies, the ball is often thrown from outside the pocket.  Unfortunately, June Jones is one of the last remaining true run and shoot coaches, and the offense has probably been absorbed into the greater NFL schematics (see here), making it unlikely to return to the NFL in its true form.  If it does, expect success with proper modernization to adjust for modern blitz schemes.  As long time NFL coach Marty Shottenheimer once said: “I don’t think anybody stops it. They always make their yardage. What you hope to do is keep the scoring down the best you can to give yourself a chance to be successful.”

(7) Split back veer adapted to the pro game.  Admittedly, this is getting into science fiction territory.  I do not think that this will happen.  However, there are reasons to believe it could be successful in the NFL.  First of all, the veer scheme has worked in recent years (see: pistol).  The NFL is warming to the idea that the option game can succeed.  The split back veer is also a “pro” formation – the split backs are in the same alignment as the original Bill Walsh west coast offense and the original Edwards BYU/Air Raid configuration.  The offense is designed for a fast, tough, smart, competitive quarterback, which are easier to find than true drop back quarterbacks.  The reads in the pass game are simplified by the potency of the run game.  Like the wing t, the split back veer has a system for play calling, with answers for every defense imaginable.  With multiple options after the snap on every play, in theory the defense is never “right.”  This is part of the reason that the offense has driven some of the most successful programs in the country, from De La Salle high school in Concord, CA, to NCAA division II power Carson Newman.

With the professionalism and skill of NFL players, the most often cited drawback of the offense (poor passing game) could be overcome with a reliance on simple, proven concepts, such as those found in the Air Raid or run and shoot systems.  Like many offenses on this list, the potency of the run game would create a strong play action passing game with easier quarterback reads.

Of course, the split back veer would require a full commitment that is unlikely to happen.  The offensive line would be in unbalanced, forward leaning stances, as would the running backs.  The quarterbacks would need to learn how to protect themselves in the run game, or face a severe beating.

It won’t happen, but it would be interesting.